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ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA TO
THE POLICY FORUM OF
COALITION 2000
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Above all, let me assure you that I welcome and support the Coalition 2000
initiative. While corruption is not a product of democracy, it may well turn
into one of the chief obstacles to the establishment of democratic values.
Even the Romans, more than 2000 years ago, were familiar with some of its
forms Ñ bribery, for instance, known under the ironic term argumentum ar-
gentarium, i.e., pecuniary evidence. The Roman politician Marcus Tullius
Cicero used to say that incorruptibility was the only quality he would ap-
preciate even in his enemies.
Today, the counteraction of corruption most urgently calls for society to take
a common stand in protection of its own interests. I am confident that this
Forum will make a real contribution towards coordinating priorities in the
anti-corruption efforts of the government, on the one hand, and of civil so-
ciety, on the other. I personally do not have any doubts that a ÒcoalitionÓ of
non-governmental organizations and government representatives has its
place in our new social practices.
The anti-corruption campaign in Bulgaria is also an essential prerequisite for
our European integration because corruption can only lead to isolation and
poverty, while democracy implies prosperity and participation in the world
economy.
I would like to wish the present Forum, as well as other Coalition 2000 ini-
tiatives in the public interest, a lot of success and productivity.
Petar Stoyanov
PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION
PLAN FOR BULGARIA
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INTRODUCTION
The present Anti-Corruption Action Plan has been developed within the
framework of the Coalition 2000 process with the purpose of becoming part
of the social agenda as a broadly approved system of measures and actions
for curbing the extremely dangerous social phenomenon of corruption.
What makes the fight against corruption of primary importance is both the
magnitude of illegal redistribution of resources to the detriment of ordinary
citizens and the fact that corruption pressure is a serious risk factor limiting
foreign investment and support for the Bulgarian transition, all while de-
moralizing the national potential for carrying out the reforms. Furthermore,
the lack of adequate public counteraction of this phenomenon undermines
efforts to establish democratic values and rule of law in this country. In turn,
making tangible progress in curbing corruption is an important political pre-
requisite for BulgariaÕs accession to the European Union.
Definitions of the complex term of corruption typically refer to the abuse of
power Ñ economic, political, or administrative Ñ for group or personal
gain, in violation of the law and the legitimate interests of individuals, a spe-
cific community, or society as a whole. The broad scope of this definition is
further warranted by the fact that effective counteraction of corruption, of
one of the most threatening national and global phenomena, requires the
concerted efforts and commitment of both the government and the citizens,
and should involve each and every sector of public life.
The long-term goal of the Action Plan is to limit, to the extent possible, cor-
ruption and its destructive consequences for society in general. The Action
Lines suggested do not assume that it is possible to eradicate corruption
once and for all, nor is it assumed that human nature is susceptible to sud-
den and radical transformation. In the mid-term, the objective is to reduce
corruption pressure and bring about a breakthrough in public attitudes to-
wards illegal forms of personal gain.
The Action Plan places special emphasis on the establishment of a favorable
institutional and legal environment for the fight against corruption. Public
administration and judiciary reforms in terms of increased transparency and
accountability are an essential precondition for the creation of an efficient
anti-corruption mechanism.
Another important area is that of private business, with the accumulated im-
proper practices and negative models of interaction with government au-
thorities, the judiciary, and the political parties. In particular, special atten-
tion has been devoted to the need to limit the corruption potential inherent
in privatization procedures, as well as the need to liberalize entrepreneurial
activities.
Civil society oraganizations should take the lead in the public awareness
campaign, which has been provisionally entitled Clean Future. To this end,
it is necessary to find the proper formula for constructive interaction with the
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authorities, combining the principle of partnership with that of citizen con-
trol.
Of particular significance is cooperation with international organizations,
foreign governments, and international experts in defining the parameters of
the anti-corruption initiative and its integration into multilateral efforts to
limit corruption in the countries in transition and the rest of the world.
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A. FIRST ACTION LINE: CREATING
A FAVORABLE INSTITUTIONAL
AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
FOR CURBING CORRUPTION
A.1.1. Background
The present state of the central and municipal administration corresponds
to the transitional nature of Bulgarian statehood and the lack of adequate le-
gal and institutional culture. The inherited and newly acquired flaws of red-
tape bureaucracy impede the clear-cut differentiation of the public from the
private sector and favor the proliferation of corruption in central and local
government. On the other hand, a lack of professionalism, poor organiza-
tion, obscure criteria and inadequate division of powers and responsibilities
among the different institutions and official positions hamper reform and
lead to the destabilization of government authority. The spheres where cor-
rupt practices are most rampant include licensing, collection of budget rev-
enues (customs duties, taxes), exercise of controlling functions and the im-
position of sanctions, public procurement, etc.
A.1.2. Objectives
The recommended reform is aimed at establishing a modern legal frame-
work of administrative activities and public services. It will incorporate the
principle of curbing and preventing corruption through legal mechanisms
and appropriate legislative and institutional measures. The reform implies
managerial and organizational development and clear-cut regulation of in-
terrelations between government authorities on the one hand, and the pri-
vate sector and citizens, on the other.
A.1.3. Actions
A.1.3.1. Adoption of a Public Administration Act
What would be achieved with such a law is a uniform structure of the gov-
ernment apparatus and more effective control over its various units; it would
further help avoid the duplication of functions among different independent
agencies, as well as among local structures of central government and the lo-
cal authorities. The law can also be expected to help overcome the present
obscure allocation of powers and responsibilities. With clear structures and
prerogatives, which are familiar to the general public, there will be fewer
opportunities for public officials to take advantage of their positions for per-
sonal gain.
A.1. Public admi-
nistration
reform
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A.1.3.2. Creating legal guarantees for transparency in the work of public ad-
ministration
Guaranteed transparency will increase public control over the activities of
the state apparatus. What could be done in this respect is to establish infor-
mation sections within government agencies to deal with citizensÕ com-
plaints and subsequently to inform them of the results. Each institution
should develop internal rules and procedures for handling the complaints
based on the existing regulations. Transparency would also be achieved by
developing mechanisms for accountability and for informing the public
about the activity of the institutions through PR departments to be estab-
lished within them. This could be regulated by their statutes. A particularly
important precondition for transparency is the legal obligation of govern-
ment agencies to provide access to information to independent media, pro-
fessional, and other non-governmental organizations concerned with their
activity.
A.1.3.3. Transfer of specific activities and services from the administration to
the private sector
For obvious reasons, the post-communist state has a monopoly over public
services, which implies maintenance of a cumbersome and inefficient state
and municipal apparatus. By relieving the administration of certain respon-
sibilities there could emerge a competitive (rather than ÒblackÓ) market for
the same activities which are now being carried out in a poor and corrupt
manner. This would free organizational and human resources that could be
reallocated to control functions. Furthermore, private companies engaged in
providing administrative services would not only receive additional eco-
nomic incentive, but would also establish themselves as a socially responsi-
ble sector in the public services market. There is every reason to expect that
one immediate implication of administrative decentralization would be the
limitation of opportunities and preconditions for corruption.
A.1.3.4. Establishment of a body with special powers to investigate cases of
corruption and submit them to the competent authorities which can take le-
gal action (prosecution, courts)
Assigning the task of combating corruption to a specialized agency is a prac-
tice existing in other countries. Several options for the institutionalization of
such an agency can be considered. The optimal approach would be to sub-
ordinate it directly to Parliament, thus taking it out of the executive branch
and in large measure guaranteeing its objectivity and autonomy. Other pos-
sibilities are to set up internal departments in the respective institutions, or
an agency with the Council of Ministers or with the office of the Minister of
Finance, in addition to that officeÕs other prerogatives (financial police). The
establishment of a specialized agency should be subject to a special law or
be regulated by provisions in the Public Administration Act, with broad po-
litical support being essential. The principal characteristics of such an
agency, especially if it is to function on a national level, are operational in-
dependence and power to conduct top-level investigations, small staff, in-
dependent and carefully selected management, capacity to access docu-
14 Coalition 2000 Ñ Clean Future
mentation, to interrogate witnesses, etc. In order to make sure that such an
institution cannot be used for political purposes or turn into an instrument
of corruption itself there should be unequivocal legal provisions regarding
when and why an investigation is to begin, objective criteria concerning its
conclusion so as to avoid unwarranted dragging out of the process, as well
as guarantees for its confidentiality. Rather than setting up a new agency or
departments, it may also be possible to extend the activity of existing au-
thorities. This would help avoid potential jurisdiction conflicts.
A.1.3.5. The role of agencies funded by extra-budgetary accounts
One approach could be to close those agencies in order to overcome the
present situation wherein they are operating as private structures. This
would be in line with IMF recommendations to close most extra-budgetary
funds and centralize them within the budget. The second approach would
take into account the fact that extra-budgetary funds do relieve the burden
of the budget and these agencies ought not to be prevented from having
their own sources of income, naturally provided that they meet account-
ability requirements.
A.1.3.6. Limiting the scope of permit and licensing regimes
It is necessary for permit and license-requiring activities to be regulated by
law, with all procedures and conditions for issuing permits and licenses stip-
ulated by the law itself, rather than by other regulations and individual acts.
A suggested course of action includes:
¥ limiting such activities to only those areas where they are absolutely in-
dispensable. In such cases there should be better guarantees for transparen-
cy. The institutions issuing permits and licenses ought to be publicly ac-
countable for their actions;
¥ disallowing any permit or licensing regimes not expressly stipulated by
law;
¥ abolishing the numerous existing ordinances, rules, and instructions regu-
lating permit and licensing regimes;
¥ abolishing all legal provisions allowing for the issuing of permits and li-
censes at the discretion of the authorities. (One case in point is the
Protection Competition Act with its section on advertising; also, the draft
law on the media, etc.);
¥ extending possibilities for control in cases of refusal to grant permits or li-
censes.
A.1.3.7. Stipulation of basic requirements concerning the proper imple-
mentation of administrative procedures
¥ In the field of foreign trade there should be strict adherence to the coun-
tryÕs commitments towards the European Union and the World Trade
Organization.
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¥ In the field of finance and the currency board there should be strict ad-
herence to the countryÕs commitments stemming from BulgariaÕs member-
ship in the IMF, including the expected adoption by Bulgaria of Article VIII
of the IMF Articles of agreement.
This adherence would lead to improvement in the methods, mode of oper-
ation and performance of public administration, and hence to better ad-
ministrative servicing of the general public. The achievement of this result
would be aided by introducing certain requirements for the administration
to follow in the decision-making process (e.g., deadlines for rendering deci-
sions, manner of informing the public about decisions made, etc.). A pilot
project in a small or medium-sized municipality could be developed and
implemented to test the anti-corruption effect.
A.1.3.8. Changing the legislation in order to reduce opportunities for sub-
jective judgments on behalf of the administration
This could be achieved through clear-cut definition of the rights, obligations,
and procedures involved in the exercise of discretionary power and by re-
viewing the philosophy of the role of government in society.
A.1.3.9. Adoption of a Civil Service Act
Such a law should clearly define the rights, obligations, and responsibilities
of public officials. In this respect, the following specific measures to curb
corruption could be undertaken:
¥ training public officials at all levels and formulating clear-cut guidelines
and codes of conduct;
¥ regulating the obligation of public officials to file income and property de-
clarations for themselves and members of their family (along with the intro-
duction of the same obligation for members of parliament). In turn, the
agencies entitled to request and verify such information should also have the
power to request officials to prove the legitimate origin of their income and
property rather than be expected to provide evidence of illegal origin them-
selves. Such authority could be assigned either to the Inspectors offices with
the ministries or to national agencies Ñ the Financial Police or the Bureau
for Investigation of Financial Fraud;
¥ regulating the admissibility of gifts to public officials, to be monitored
through internal control mechanisms;
¥ introducing a public register to ensure transparency of the financial and
property status of high-ranking public officials;
¥ preventing conflicts of interest.
A.1.3.10. Introduction of a system of performance evaluation of public offi-
cials, including disciplinary measures with the aim of enhancing internal
control effectiveness
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Controlling functions could be assigned to a body with the office of the
Minister of Public Administration as provided by the draft law on public of-
ficials.
A.1.3.11. Improved remuneration of public officials, combined with viable
control and evaluation mechanisms
This will improve the motivation of public officials, as well as their social sta-
tus.
A.1.3.12. Establishing internal rules and detailed instructions
To achieve this objective, the rules and instructions concerning relations of
the general public with the institutions should be publicly accessible and as
simple, clear, and specific as possible. The publication of the rules and in-
structions in the press will lead to better awareness of citizens of their rights
and the obligations of public officials. In this way, the rules and instructions
will themselves become even more binding for public officials. Their obser-
vation will be a safeguard against arbitrariness and infringement of citizensÕ
interests.
A.1.3.13. Legal regulation of measures and sanctions of varying scope and
form for public officials involved in corruption
It is necessary to provide for both criminal sanctions and disciplinary action.
The liability to various forms of legal action will have a deterring effect on
the conduct of public officials. Disciplinary action could include demotion
or financial liability of officials in case of unprofitable deals endorsed as a re-
sult of corruption. In this respect civil liability is deemed more effective.
Financial liability ought to include reimbursement of any expenses involved
in the termination of the contract. At the same time, the officials who have
helped expose corrupt practices should be encouraged and receive part of
the damages or fine owed by those involved in corruption.
A.1.3.14. Introduction of a legal ban on public officials becoming members
of the governing bodies of commercial companies as a means of ensuring in-
dependent decision making. Any exceptions to this ban ought to be care-
fully considered and thoroughly regulated by law, so as to avoid leaving any
loopholes on the one hand, and prevent such a regulation from becoming a
potential barrier to hiring qualified staff in public administration, on the oth-
er.
A.1.3.15. Introduction of restrictions regarding immediate hierarchical sub-
ordination of public officials to spouses or family members (lineal or collat-
eral relationships up to the fourth degree). The restriction could be applied
only in the case of transactions and actions where such a dependence actu-
ally occurs rather than the assumption of office in principle.
A.1.3.16. Providing for personnel rotation mechanisms in the relevant laws
or regulations
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In this manner, public officials could maintain their qualification and further
develop their skills by assuming comparable positions and similar functions
all while avoiding routine interaction with specific private individuals.
A.2.1. Background
The existing public agencies and departments with control and monitoring
functions are not always capable of counteracting corrupt practices in a
timely and effective manner. These specialized agencies are themselves not
immune to corruption. There have been cases of abuse even among officials
whose very prerogatives include prevention of the various forms of corrup-
tion. In this situation, the role of the Parliamentary Committee to Counter
Crime and Corruption appears as all the more important, along with the im-
provement of similar existing institutions and the establishment of new ones.
A.2.2. Objectives
To enhance the role of existing institutions and establish new ones with con-
trolling and monitoring functions in the fight against corruption. Those are
institutions outside the judicial system with varying status Ñ either exercis-
ing proper control functions (e.g. the National Audit Office), or having a su-
pervisory and intermediary role without real powers and resources. Each, by
virtue of its role and purpose, should act as an additional safeguard against
the various manifestations of corruption and its consequences.
A.2.3. Actions
A.2.3.1. Enhancing the role of the National Audit Office as a supreme au-
thority with independent external control over the implementation of the
budgets approved by the National Assembly and municipal councils.
The importance of this institution stems from the fact that all organizations
funded or partially supported by the central and municipal budgets are sub-
ject to its control (including national security agencies and special services),
as are the extra-budgetary accounts, relations between the Bulgarian
National Bank (BNB) and the government, the revenues and expenditures of
not-for-profit legal entities and funds supported by the budget or guaranteed
by the government, etc. The responsibilities of the National Audit Office as
a constitutionally-established body include auditing, filing of certified re-
ports, penal ordinances, injunctions for cessation of misuse of public funds
or activities which may inflict damage on state property, etc.
Enhancing the role of the National Audit Office as an authority for indepen-
dent external control over the execution of the budget and over government
stakes in the economy goes hand in hand with improving budget proce-
dures. As detailed earlier, such improvements would include the consolida-
tion of the budget and the cutting back of extra-budgetary accounts, as well
as the provision of reliable information about the drawing up and execution
of the budget, and public access to this information.
A.2. Establishing
new institu-
tions and of-
fices with
controlling
and monitor-
ing functions,
and improv-
ing existing
ones
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It is above all necessary to analyze the practice of the National Audit Office
to date by summarizing the most frequently observed violations and assess-
ing the effectiveness of the control exercised.
Secondly, specific proposals are needed for legislative changes that would
contribute towards establishing the National Audit Office as a supreme body
for independent external control and for improving its activity in terms of
the fight against corruption. Such proposals should be geared toward:
¥ adopting European and international principles of external and internal
control and avoiding the overlapping of spheres of control;
¥ extending the forms and methods of macro-economic control; enhancing
the analytical aspect of control and elaborating forms of system performance
assessment on a macro-level (briefings and reports to the National
Assembly);
¥ more rigorous routine supervision of the institutions under its control;
¥ strengthening the preventive control exercised by the National Audit
Office;
¥ building up a relevant data base;
¥ developing the consultative functions of the National Audit Office and us-
ing its input in discussions on draft laws concerning systems under its con-
trol;
¥ streamlining the organizational structure of the National Audit Office;
¥ establishing a legal consultative council with the National Audit Office;
¥ setting up an internal office to maintain its contacts with the National
Assembly;
¥ clearer regulation of relations with the other state institutions (National
Assembly, judiciary authorities, Bulgarian National Bank, State Financial
Control), of the interaction among them and of the differentiation of their
control functions;
¥ creating a subcommittee with the Parliamentary Budget Committee and
elaborating rules and procedures for the discussion in the National Assembly
of important issues in the activity of the National Audit Office, for submit-
ting reports by the National Audit Office in the course of parliamentary de-
liberations on the central budget, and for assessments of the public stakes in
the economy and the banking sector.
A.2.3.2. Improvement of financial and fiscal control
The need to enhance the effect of control and financial discipline calls for
amendments to the State Financial Control Act. Though financial control has
deep-rooted traditions in this country, it should be improved to better cor-
respond to the new economic and social environment. This can be achieved
through improvement of the forms of liability which may be applied by State
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Financial Control authorities: increased fines in cases of administrative
penalties and extended applicability of full financial liability for unlawfully
inflicted damage.
There is also a call for changes in tax legislation aimed at clearer regulation
of the powers of tax authorities and simplification of the taxation process.
The instructions issued by the General Department of Tax Administration
should receive wider publicity and become familiar not only to tax admin-
istration officials, but taxpayers as well. Greater incentives for officials to
contribute to exposing tax evasion attempts would help increase budget rev-
enues. For instance, 10% of the due tax payments could be paid to the re-
spective officials. Tougher sanctions for proven instances of corruption
should be made possible through increasing the powers of internal control
agencies. A public register of the income of tax administration officials
should be introduced. All of the principles cited above are fully applicable
to customs officers as well.
The decrease in tax and customs duty rates will be achieved through an in-
crease in the tax and customs duty base with the help of clear, precise and
simple rules for the work of those administrations. More active utilization of
the tax police (the Office for the Prevention and Exposure of Tax Evasion)
may contribute to the reduction of corruption within the tax administration
through the exercise of continuing control.
¥ Strengthening specialized control over money laundering, including co-
operation with the European Union and its member states (proposed mea-
sures connected to the introduction of the single European currency).
¥ Amending the Civil Procedure Code with the aim of speeding up the ren-
dering of decisions in cases involving misappropriation of funds.
¥ Regulating the mechanisms for informing the general public, the execu-
tive, and Parliament on the results of control, especially in corruption-relat-
ed cases.
¥ Improving the efficiency of interaction between State Financial Control,
the National Audit Office, tax and customs administration, the Ministry of
the Interior departments, and the judiciary, through the adoption and im-
plementation of jointly approved instructions. Furthermore, it is necessary to
review the role of State Financial Control with the aim of avoiding duplica-
tion of functions with the National Audit Office (for instance by removing
the function of external audit from State Financial Control).
¥ Establishing an integrated information system for control authorities and
the law-enforcement agencies.
¥ Developing a system of control over ministry and institution management.
¥ Improving the internal financial control offices within the various agencies
and organizations.
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A.2.3.2. Establishing the Ombudsman institution
The Ombudsman, in the countries where it exists, is a government-funded
office, dedicated to monitoring the management of public processes and
the activity of public authorities. This involves supervision of a rather broad
sphere of managerial and administrative activities, including:
1. Implementation of executive power or administration in the narrow
sense of the word.
2. Organization and management of the judicial system administration.
3. Implementation of public activities and services by non-governmental or-
ganizations.
Unlike the National Audit Office, the Ombudsman office does not have any
executive authority. It ought not to duplicate court, administrative, and fi-
nancial control, nor compete with the prerogatives of the constitutional au-
thorities.
The successful establishment and development of such an institution could
make it an important factor in the consolidation and improvement of the
general rules and principles underlying the activity of the administration and
the conduct of public officials.
To this end, it would be useful to first organize discussions with the partici-
pation of experts and politicians, meet with MPs, publish relevant articles,
etc. These activities should lead up to the elaboration of a draft law on the
establishment of the Ombudsman office and should encourage advocacy
efforts for its adoption.
A report by a working group at the Center for the Study of Democracy en-
titled ÒEstablishing the Institution of the Ombudsman in BulgariaÓ can serve
as a starting point in this respect. The report summarizes and analyzes for-
eign experience regarding the establishment and functioning of the
Ombudsman and other similar institutions. It also outlines the fundamental
principles and provisions of a possible future legal regulation of such an of-
fice in Bulgaria with a view to current needs, public attitudes, and political
and constitutional realities in this country.
A.3.1. Background
The practical implementation of the Public Procurement Act, effective since
1997, has revealed a number of shortcomings inherent in the law. At the
same time, the government has drawn up an ambitious investment program
for the coming years. This will activate the public procurement mechanism
and heighten the responsibility of state institutions.
A.3.2. Objectives
The legislation and practice in this area should be brought in compliance
with European standards. Another key objective is to enhance control over
the implementation of legal public procurement mechanisms.
A.3. Developing
the public
procurement
system
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A.3.3. Actions
A.3.3.1. Conducting an expert discussion on legal changes required for the
further development of the public procurement system
A.3.3.2. Taking measures to prevent bypassing of the Public Procurement
Act
A.3.3.3. Developing an effective system of handling complaints and arbitra-
tion
A.4.1 Background
There are a number of specific reasons for corruption in the political party
system. Above all, the political parties are financially weak. They are not ca-
pable of ensuring their self-support solely from their own legitimate sources
of financing Ñ membership dues Ñ and therefore become dependent on
potential sponsors. The legal ban on any business activity by political parties
further contributes to this situation. Another reason is the fact that to the ma-
jority of politicians, holding a public office is their principal means of sup-
port and hard to replace by some other, private activity. Upon leaving of-
fice, politicians become strongly dependent on potential sponsors in the vir-
tual absence of well-developed mechanisms for the retirement of high-rank-
ing political leaders into the private or professional sphere. Moreover, per-
sonal loyalties (among family and friends) play an extremely important
regulatory role in political life, which is why a large number of politicians be-
come heavily dependent on private interests. The very procedures for pub-
lic decision-making and for public activity therefore fail to clearly differenti-
ate private from public interests. This creates preconditions for their over-
lapping, mutual substitution, and ultimately, for corruption.
A.4.2. Objectives
It is generally assumed that further improvement in the political party sphere
is a job or task for politicians. However, relations among the latter are sub-
ject to the rules of uncompromising political competition, which hampers
any constructive interaction, even when mutually beneficial. In this sector,
non-governmental organizations can successfully play the role of initiators of
public dialogue in order to enlist sufficiently broad-based support for a com-
plex set of measures for transparency and accountability.
A.4.3. Actions
The adoption of the following, more specific measures ought to be consid-
ered within the context of the public dialogue:
A.4.3.1. Increasing the requirements for transparency in the overall activity
of political parties
This condition includes adherence to the procedures laid down in the par-
ty statutes, such as regular holding of party forums, efficient internal party
control mechanisms, etc. Such requirements could be set not only for the
A.4. Reform of the
political party
sphere
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court registration of political parties but could possibly apply to each regis-
tration for participation in national elections.
A.4.3.2. Introduction of a system of public financing of political parties
If such a system is put in place, the parties will be less dependent on private
sponsorship. Quite appropriate for Bulgaria is the EU practice of allocation
of state subsidies according to the number of votes cast for the respective
party in the latest parliamentary elections, combined with the use of addi-
tional criteria aimed at assisting newly established parties.
A.4.3.3. Prohibition of donations to political parties and their affiliated orga-
nizations by legal entities, as well as by foreign private individuals and legal
entities
What could be introduced instead, as practiced in some European coun-
tries, is a special common donation fund in support of political parties which
would collect all donations and allocate them among the parties according
to a commonly agreed system (for instance, depending on the votes ob-
tained). At the same time, part of the funds could be distributed equally
among the political parties to ensure their equal treatment and support new-
ly established parties.
A.4.3.4. Transparent party finances
All parties should be obliged to submit annual public financial statements.
This requirement should be backed by possible sanctions for failure to com-
ply, including withdrawal of the state subsidy, a fine, or in extreme cases of
malpractice, rejection of applications for court or election registration (the
latter provision should be elaborated in thorough detail so as to avoid pos-
sible abuse).
A.4.3.5. Transparency of election campaigns
A common election campaign fund should be established for distribution
among the parties. At the same time, parties should be held fully account-
able for all expenditures made in election campaigns. An essential precon-
dition for transparency is the equal treatment of parties during election cam-
paigns, particularly with regard to the free-of-charge access to state-owned
electronic media.
A.4.3.6. Regulation of relations between political parties and the state
This would involve a clearer distinction between the public-and-state, and
the private-and-party spheres; legal restrictions resulting in fewer possibili-
ties for elected officials to appoint and dismiss public officials at their own
discretion, including state-owned company employees; legal regulation of
lobbying in line with existing practices in the EU; mandatory transparency of
the income of politicians; strict observance of the principle prohibiting
members of parliament from holding any position in the governing bodies
of companies.
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B. SECOND ACTION LINE:
REFORMING THE JUDICIAL
SYSTEM
In recent years the judicial system has invariably been among the most un-
popular institutions in this country. It receives a low measure of trust both
from the public at large and from other state institutions. It is popularly be-
lieved to be slow, inefficient, and corrupt. The need to reform the system is
acknowledged by a large number of the magistrates.
The reform is expected to achieve a number of specific objectives: to pro-
vide conditions for greater openness and transparency and speedier admin-
istration of justice; to create internal control mechanisms to prevent abuse
of power; and to establish a system for raising the professional skills of those
working in the judicial system.
B.1.1. Background
Legislation, both in the field of penal law and in the field of civil and ad-
ministrative law, is all too contradictory and part of it is obsolete and inade-
quate. The shortcomings of the existing legislation are particularly well ex-
ploited by those involved in corrupt practices. The changes in legislation are
expected to lead to clear-cut rules in commercial, civil, and administrative
legal relations and, in turn, to faster, more efficient and more transparent ad-
ministration of justice.
B.1.2. Objectives
In order to minimize the conditions favorable to corruption and to devise
mechanisms of control over corrupt practices, it is necessary to undertake a
comprehensive reexamination of the existing legislation and envision the
appropriate legislative changes. These changes should be implemented in a
consistent manner and as part of an overall strategy for curbing the subver-
sive phenomenon of corruption.
B.1.3. Actions
B.1.3.1. In the field of criminal law
A comprehensive program must be elaborated for a new penal policy and
modern crime control strategies. It should serve as the basis for a new Penal
Code, new Penal Procedure Code, and a new Law on the Execution of
Punishments.
The current system for criminal prosecution is slow, cumbersome, and inef-
ficient. The crimes and punishments provided for in the Penal Code and the
Penal Procedure Code do not adequately reflect present conditions of mar-
ket economy and rampant crime. In the past years there have been many
B.1. Legislative
reform
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legislative changes aimed at updating the Penal Code and procedure, but
rather than being guided by a comprehensive new vision, they have been
implemented piecemeal. Now, the overarching goal should be to bring the
legislation up to date; that is, in line with European requirements for human
rights observation while ensuring expeditious administration of justice.
B.1.3.2. Changes in the Penal Code
The new Penal Code should be adjusted to better suit changed social rela-
tions and to meet the requirements for countering corruption, both in terms
of the types of crimes addressed, and the system of punishments. The fol-
lowing specific changes are recommended:
¥ criminalization of the ÒnewÓ forms of crime, especially in the sphere of
the economy (for instance, using legal entities for criminal activities, estab-
lishment of unlawful monopoly, profiting through exploitation of con-
sumers, etc.);
¥ more adequate provisions concerning crimes against creditors, crimes
commissioned by an organization or group, drug-related crimes, and em-
bezzlement;
¥ decriminalization of soliciting acceptance of a bribe when such solicita-
tion is intended to expose corrupt magistrates and other officials;
¥ legal provision for the confiscation of property acquired as a result of cor-
ruption, including those cases where the property has been transferred to
third parties in order to be preserved;
¥ refined categorization of illegal acts in terms of differentiation between
crimes and misdemeanors;
¥ on the basis of the above distinction, provision for more stringent sen-
tences for grave crimes and alleviated sanctions for misdemeanors;
¥ introduction of new penalties which do not involve imprisonment and
new provisions concerning fines;
¥ introduction of provisions for probation Ñ a punishment involving com-
munity service under administrative supervision but without separation from
the family and the usual environment. Failure to abide by the conditions of
probation could result in imprisonment;
¥ further incentives for lawful conduct of offenders: allowing more lenient
sentences in cases of cooperation with the investigation, confession, or pay-
ment of damages.
B.1.3.3. Changes in the Penal Procedure Code
It is recommended that the new Penal Procedure Code create conditions for
openness and transparency in penal proceedings by shifting the center of
the process towards the court. Stricter court control over the work of au-
thorities engaged in investigative proceedings is also recommended.
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The new Penal Procedure Code should provide for more efficient and flex-
ible proceedings with more possibilities for faster and more cost-effective
punishment of the numerous minor offenses. This would actually speed up
high crime proceedings because the number of cases awaiting trial would be
reduced. The following steps can be recommended in this context:
¥ simplifying investigative proceedings concerning offenses which do not
pose a serious threat to public welfare and order;
¥ providing the option of court-sanctioned settlement as an alternative to
criminal prosecution in a broad category of cases, excluding high crimes.
Such a policy should certainly be applied with regard to theft, the most
widespread offense;
¥ replacing criminal prosecution with civil action procedures in certain cas-
es (for instance, with regard to public insult and libel disseminated through
the media);
¥ strengthening measures for control over police officers, supervisory bod-
ies and magistrates working on criminal cases;
¥ setting practicable tightened deadlines for initiating proceedings and pro-
nouncing sentences.
B.1.4.1. Background
The existing legal framework of civil relations leaves opportunities for cor-
ruption.
B.1.4.2. Objectives
The task of civil law is the equitable regulation of relations among individual
citizens as well as between citizens and the state. This branch of legislation
does not have an immediate bearing on corruption. Because of its inherent
shortcomings, however, it creates conditions favoring the occurrence and
unrestrained proliferation of corruption. The objective is to reduce the op-
portunities for corrupt practices by amending the laws regulating business,
contractual and other civil relations.
B.1.4.3. Actions
B.1.4.4. Changes in the field of material civil law and administrative law
¥ Simplifying the procedures related to the acquisition of property, business
transactions, privatization contracts, the granting of concessions, and other
activities where private interests are intertwined with the prerogatives of
state authorities. These interactions should be facilitated by greatly restrict-
ing possibilities for administrative intervention.
¥ Introducing a more liberal regime for real estate transactions, and simpli-
fied administrative procedures for company registration Ñ on the basis of a
legally established set of requirements beyond which the registration au-
thorities cannot set any further conditions.
B.1.4. In the field
of civil law
and pro-
ceedings
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¥ Speeding up procedures for declaring insolvency.
B.1.4.5. Changes to the court order execution procedure aimed at securing
speedy and effective satisfaction of claims and rights established through the
courts
The court order execution procedure in the active Civil Procedure Code is
outdated and cumbersome, and can sometimes render meaningless even
the best of court rulings. Its regulations tend to protect much more the rights
of the debtor than those of the creditor. It is possible to deliberately delay
the execution of an obligation until it becomes impossible to fulfill. In some
countries, the execution officers of the court are not state officials but pri-
vate individuals acting under strictly established rules but with a vested in-
terest in the speedy and efficient execution of court orders.
B.1.5.1. Background
It is well known that legal proceedings under both civil (including commer-
cial and administrative) and criminal cases are slow and harbor opportuni-
ties for involved parties to intentionally drag out the process in bad faith. In
order to speed up the process of administration of justice, it is not enough
simply to change procedural regulations.
B.1.5.2. Objectives
Legislative changes should be considered that would encourage procedural
economy, discipline and expeditious exercise of the rights of the parties in-
volved.
B.1.5.3. Actions
¥ To propose changes in the Attorney Act, as well as in the Penal Procedure
Code and Civil Procedure Code that would provide for serious sanctions
against lawyers who abuse procedural rights to intentionally prolong or de-
lay court proceedings.
¥ To further develop the system of subpoenaing witnesses in order to pre-
clude the possibility for intentional delays of court proceedings.
¥ To consider the possibility of establishing institutions for alternative settle-
ment of disputes (voluntary arbitration, mediation) the acts of which would
provide valid grounds for execution.
B.2.1. Background
The judicial system operates in an outdated, overly-bureaucratized, and slow
manner. Its current poor organization is a source of corruption and frustration
not only for ordinary citizens but also for those working within the system.
B.2.1. Objectives
A comprehensive and competent reform of the judicial system should be
planned and made subject to a broad debate. It should lead to improve-
B.2. Reorganizing
the operation
of the judicial
system
B.1.5. General
proposals
in the field
of adminis-
tration of
justice
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ment and modernization of the methods of operation of the courts, prose-
cution offices, and the investigative services.
B.2.2. Actions
In this respect, it is necessary to do the following:
¥ develop and implement automated filing systems which should guarantee
speed and reliability in processing case files as well as fast and easy access
for citizens to the information they need.
¥ develop a system of case assignment to magistrates based on objective
criteria, precluding the possibility of preferentially appointing a specific
magistrate to work on a given case.
¥ implement the practice of rotation for magistrates and staff working in
sectors with high risk of corruption;
¥ introduce group assignment of official tasks involving a high risk of cor-
ruption.
B.3.1. Background
Presently there are many professionals working in the judicial system, yet a
significant number of magistrates are young people with good theoretical
background but little professional and life experience. In the everyday exer-
cise of their duties they constantly come up against various difficulties, and
the shortcomings in their performance are largely due to this lack of prepa-
ration for the specific nature of the work. On the other hand, experienced
magistrates face problems arising from constant changes in legislation and
therefore need further training. But programs for basic training and contin-
uing education of magistrates are yet to be developed. To a great extent, it
is in fact the lack of experience and skills that account for negative results in
the operation of the judicial system even though the general public tends to
attribute them to corrupt practices.
There are no special programs in Bulgaria designed to promote a certain
kind of professional and personal conduct for magistrates in line with the so-
cial significance of their profession.
A system of evaluation of magistrates is lacking.
The professional skills of the supporting staff of the judicial system are high-
ly inadequate. Their duties are most demanding and the conditions of work
primitive. No professional training has been provided for them and their
performance is sometimes so poor as to thwart the efforts of the magistrates.
B.3.2. Objectives
To help provide basic training and continuing education for magistrates. In
this respect, the Association of Judges in Bulgaria has designed a project for
the establishment of a Center for Training of Judges. If this project is put
B.3. Improving
staff recruit-
ment proce-
dures and
professional
training
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through and proves viable, the Center could also take up the training of
prosecutors and investigative service officers.
It would be extremely useful to devise a methodology for selecting and eval-
uating the staff of the judicial system. It should be based on a comprehen-
sive, competent and objective performance appraisal of each magistrate
and on the results of the basic training and continuing education courses
completed.
B.3.3. Actions
¥ Designing training programs for newly appointed magistrates which
should include lectures on corruption.
¥ Designing training programs for experienced magistrates in connection
with changes in legislation.
¥ Designing training programs for court staff.
¥ Devising codes of conduct.
¥ Determining objective promotion criteria taking into account the results
from the professional training courses completed.
¥ Placing appointments and upper-level promotions within the judicial sys-
tem on a competitive basis. Conducting the competitions under conditions
of transparency and public access to information.
¥ Coordinating appointment and promotion proposals with those working
in the respective branch of the judiciary (with expression of opinion through
secret ballot).
¥ Developing a system of collective assessment of magistrates before they
have completed 3 years in office; i.e., before achieving the status of irre-
placeability. None other than the bar is in a better position to properly as-
sess the professional skills and integrity of the magistrates.
¥ Introducing psychological tests as part of the magistrate recruitment pro-
cedure.
B.4.1. Background
Corruption in general, and the crime of bribery in particular, are difficult to
prove. Moreover, when a given dispute is brought to court or a criminal in-
vestigation is initiated, the vested interests are so intense that the situation is
highly conducive to corruption. It would be naive to believe that it is possi-
ble to prove and punish all instances of corruption. It is nevertheless neces-
sary to consider practical means of preventing corruption and encouraging
intolerance among magistrates with regard to suspicious conduct on the part
of their colleagues.
B.4. Taking mea-
sures to ex-
pose corrup-
tion in the ju-
dicial system
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B.4.2. Objectives
It is necessary to create mechanisms which would allow to link the conduct
of corrupt magistrates to their conspicuous financial gains. 
It is in the interest of the judicial system as a whole to rid itself of corrupt and
poorly qualified judges, prosecutors and investigation officers in order for
honest professionals to be able to perform their duties in a confident and
proper manner.
B.4.3. Actions
¥ Introducing an annually updated public register of magistratesÕ income
and property.
¥ Creating a special commission with a temporary mandate to investigate
reported instances of corruption. The commission ought to be appointed by
the Supreme Judicial Council but work independently from it.
¥ Enhancing internal control in the judicial system through open discussions
about the conduct and problems of individual magistrates within their re-
spective offices.
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C. THIRD ACTION LINE: CURBING
CORRUPTION IN THE
ECONOMY
C.1.1. Background
In the absence of sufficiently clear, detailed, transparent rules and the nec-
essary civic control, the privatization process is particularly vulnerable to
corruption and public officials are able to achieve personal gain to the
detriment of the public interest. Also, the lack of control gives free rein to
the various forms of illegal activities making up the so-called informal or
shadow economy.
A number of international studies have provided evidence that there is a di-
rect link between the level of government intervention in the economy and
corruption in society. A consistent economic policy aimed at liberalization
and deregulation of private enterprise, macro-economic stabilization and
privatization of state-owned property would greatly limit the opportunities
for corruption.
As a result of privatization, private owners are forming political pressure
groups aimed at restricting government intervention in business and reduc-
ing the cost of business transactions.
C.1.2. Objectives
To restrict as far as possible the Òbreeding groundÓ of corruption in privati-
zation, and to speed up the process would limit opportunities for corrupt
practices. Shedding more light on regulations and procedures would make
more transparent the conditions under which the state is selling its proper-
ty, and help clarify both the intentions and commitments of the buyers.
Furthermore, it is necessary to involve civil society structures in the process
of elaborating business interaction rules and minimizing the discretionary
power of the administration.
C.1.3 Actions
C.1.3.1. To discuss ways of streamlining privatization mechanisms, including
the possibility of consolidating the various privatization authorities into a sin-
gle institution which would be subject to close control
For instance, a Ministry of Privatization could be created on the model of
the German Treuhand, or the Privatization Agency could be transformed to
become part of the executive and be subject to both parliamentary and
public control by means of its Supervisory Board. Another option is for the
Council of Ministers, as the supreme body under Article 3 of the
Transformation and Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises Act, to
initiate privatization procedures for all applicable enterprises. Such a trans-
C.1. Transparency
and account-
ability in the
privatization
process
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parent approach would put an end to the practice of bribery for the purpose
of having privatization procedures initiated for specific enterprises.
C.1.3.2. Changes in the regulation of privatization methods and forms; e.g.,
regulating the procedure of Ònegotiations with potential buyersÓ through a
legal act, rather than internal ordinances of the privatizing agencies
C.1.3.3. To further activate privatization through the stock market, which
has a well-organized and transparent mechanism for the sale of securities of
joint-stock companies and gives buyers a large measure of confidence in
terms of guaranteeing the deals and providing full information about the
companies traded
C.1.3.4. More effective use of auctions and tenders as methods of privatiza-
tion in order to accelerate the process and increase its transparency
C.1.3.5. Enhancing the role of post-privatization control and introducing re-
fined and consistent procedures for its implementation
C.1.3.6. Introducing legal provisions for exclusion of potential investors with
a past record of failure to fulfill the commitments laid down in the privati-
zation contract
A number of sanctions could be considered for buyersÕ failure to meet com-
mitments, including the termination of privatization contracts, with investors
forfeiting the amounts already paid.
C.1.3.7. Effective monitoring of the post-privatization process in the case of
transactions which do not involve 100% payment upon the signing of the
privatization contract and legal provisions for public control in such in-
stances
It is further necessary to limit the significance of long-term commitments
made by potential buyers (future investments, number of jobs, paying off
debts) in designating the preferred bidder in tenders or negotiations.
C.1.3.8. Increasing institutional liability and transparency of privatization de-
cisions, including those concerning the sale of significant assets of state com-
panies
C.1.3.9. Legal provisions for public access to information on negotiations
and privatization deals, including those involving intermediaries
C.1.3.10. Further regulation of management-and-employee buyouts limiting
the preferential treatment of management-and-employee companies only
to the privatization of small enterprises, for instance companies with book
value of fixed assets not exceeding BGL 300 million
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C.2.1. Background
State property transformation and market economy development are taking
place under the inherited government-dominated models of economic reg-
ulation. Public administration has a vested interest in preserving its extensive
prerogatives in the sphere of economic relations which, in turn, creates pre-
conditions for unlawful personal gain by public officials. Furthermore, the
current situation in many sectors of the economy hampers private initiative
and subjects it to bureaucratic mechanisms and forms of regulation.
C.2.2. Objectives
To finalize the institutional and legal framework of the development of pri-
vate business in Bulgaria and progressively remove all existing barriers to
free enterprise. This will be made possible by scaling government interven-
tion down to reasonable limits and by completing the process of economic
reforms in the transition to a market economy.
C.2.3. Actions
The goals set call for changes and amendments to the legal framework and
improved practical implementation of existing regulations. This would in-
volve:
¥ improved implementation of the Protection of Competition Act and elab-
oration of anti-trust legislation;
¥ accelerated efforts to build up the market infrastructure with an empha-
sis on the development of organized markets;
¥ gradual transition from permit- and license-requiring economic activity to
a system of registration;
¥ reasonable liberalization of foreign trade and the foreign currency regime;
¥ minimizing the need to seek authorization from a state body Ñ discre-
tionary decisions ought to be avoided and officials should adhere strictly to
existing legal regulations;
¥ limiting price control practices and the granting of government subsidies,
tax, and credit incentives;
¥ delegating control functions to professional and business associations on
the basis of codes of conduct; i.e., making it their own obligation to base
their economic activity on certain rules and norms;
¥ changes in the legal framework of business activity which would encour-
age bringing the ×shadowÒ into the legitimate economy;
¥ adoption and strict implementation of regulations on the economic rela-
tions between public and private entities (for instance with regard to the sys-
tem of public procurement).
C.2. Liberalizing
the condi-
tions for pri-
vate business
development
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C.3.1. Background
Corruption does not only occur where state and private interests intersect.
Both global practices and the most recent history of the private sector revival
in Bulgaria demonstrate that some of the most conspicuous forms of cor-
ruption are frequently observed in the relations between private companies.
Private corporations with no majority shareholder are particularly exposed
to such risks. Memories are still fresh of the colossal (by Bulgarian standards)
corruption in private banks, most of which went bankrupt on account of
corrupt crediting practices. The private sector has also produced the most
notorious example of corruption in Bulgaria Ñ the so-called credit million-
aires, who, in addition to orchestrating pyramid economic structures, have
given a negative image to the entire banking and financial system.
C.3.2. Objectives
To avert the distortion of financial and business relations in the private sec-
tor under the influence of corrupt practices and attitudes.
C.3.3. Actions
C.3.3.1. Limiting corruption in the private sector through consistent eco-
nomic reforms facilitating free competition and private enterprise
C.3.3.2. Establishing a clear and effective legal framework for business de-
velopment. By means of changes and amendments to existing regulations,
simple and reliable rules should be introduced for the various types of eco-
nomic activity which would guarantee greater transparency and account-
ability in business practices.
C.3.3.3. The recent financial scandals involving insolvent banks could be
used to reconstruct and analyze the pattern of emergence of Òcredit mil-
lionairesÓ in order to make specific recommendations for preventing the re-
currence of such practices in the future activity of private banks
C.3.3.4. The corporate tax and income tax laws should incorporate the no-
tion of financial status as used in European legislation. Tax authorities would,
in other words, have the right and obligation, in cases of suspected tax eva-
sion, to evaluate the financial status of legal entities and private individuals.
In the presence of discrepancies between financial status and income de-
clared, there should be appropriate procedures for determining whether
there is a breach of law, as well as provisions for severe penalties, including
imprisonment and property confiscation.
C.4.1. Background
The practice to date abounds with examples of people taking the law into
their own hands and resorting to illegal coercive means and ÒprotectorsÓ in
order to deal with arising disputes or fraud. In turn, this favors the prolifera-
tion of corruption in the process of seeking protection by various state au-
thorities, administrative services and officials.
C.4. Enhancing
the effective-
ness of eco-
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C.4.2. Objectives
To ensure a far more expeditious procedure for protecting the interests of
private owners and entrepreneurs in cases of fraud, failure to fulfill contract
obligations, and other forms of defaulting and illegal conduct.
C.4.3. Actions
C.4.3.1. Analysis of the Civil Procedure Code in terms of the provisions and
conditions for legal protection against economic fraud
C.4.3.2. Specifying norms for arbitration and settlement of the legal disputes
most typical of small and medium-sized business
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D. FOURTH ACTION LINE:
ENHANCING CIVIC CONTROL
IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
CORRUPTION
D.1.1. Background
Due to the early stage of development and institutionalization of civil soci-
ety in Bulgaria, it is still not in a position to exercise adequate control over
public administration, political institutions and the judiciary. Efforts in this
direction have so far come up against the wish of government structures to
preserve the status quo, often to the detriment of citizensÕ rights.
D.1.2. Objectives
It is necessary to develop a mechanism of permanent and effective civic
control over government structures which should be based on clearly de-
fined legal rules for dialogue and interaction between civil society structures
and public administration. This is one of the essential prerequisites for safe-
guarding the democratic rights of citizens and most notably, their right to in-
formation. Furthermore, civic control would help place citizens on an equal
footing with the authorities in their mutual cooperation.
D.1.3. Actions
D.1.3.1. Suggesting a framework for the institutionalization of civic control
over corruption in public administration, political organizations and the ju-
dicial system
The development, implementation and adequate institutionalization of a
system of public control over corruption is a crucial precondition for effec-
tively influencing the administration, political organizations and the judicial
system.
Such a system would assume several important functions:
¥ to initiate preventive action by promoting citizen involvement in the dis-
cussion of legal documents and regulations and by providing decision-mak-
ers with data and analysis concerning risks of occurrence of corruption;
¥ to mobilize civil society resources in the identification, monitoring and
control of corrupt practices and the factors preconditioning their occur-
rence;
¥ to monitor and evaluate the effect of anti-corruption political decisions;
D.1. Developing
the institu-
tional frame-
work of civic
control
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¥ to provide decision-makers with adequate information (based on data
and analysis) concerning current trends and problems in the fight against
corruption;
¥ to promote greater transparency and to encourage the more active exer-
cise of civil rights and involvement of civil society in the control of public ad-
ministration activity.
D.1.3.2. Establishing citizen representation in state institutions
Most essentially, NGO representatives should be guaranteed free access to
the meetings and documents of state institutions. This access should be sub-
ject to legal regulations which should allow for exceptions only for reasons
of national security.
In this context, it would be worthwhile:
¥ to further develop the legal framework of the interaction between the ad-
ministration and civil society structures;
¥ to institute modern legislative regulation of the formal status of non-gov-
ernmental organizations (Law on NGOs);
¥ to enhance the ability of NGOs to implement civic control over the ac-
tivity of public administration through appropriate forms of training and ed-
ucation.
D.1.3.3. Elaborating and publishing a Corruption Assessment Index
An integrated index presenting periodic studies of corrupt practices and
public attitudes is to be elaborated within the non-governmental sector.
Expert opinions in this area are to be summarized using both quantitative
and qualitative methods. Through the regularly updated Corruption Indices
the findings of the studies will be provided to the media for broader dis-
semination.
D.1.3.4. Initiation of collaborative relations among NGOs for the purpose of
counteracting corruption
Regular and constructive cooperation between NGOs is indispensable for
the successful establishment of citizen control, and hence, for the imple-
mentation of the present anti-corruption Action Plan. For this purpose, it is
necessary to formally define the parameters of this cooperation in such a
way that implies a Ôdivision of laborÕ among NGOs according to profile and
resources.
D.1.3.5. Establishing collaborative relations between civil society and state
institutions within the Coalition 2000 process
Civil society cannot take on the fight against corruption on its own. By virtue
of their broad powers and obligations, public authorities ought to become a
reliable partner and decisive factor in the implementation of the present
Action Plan. Bulgarian legislation has largely set down the rules for interac-
tion between state institutions and those of civil society, but social and po-
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litical practices in recent years have failed to produce working models of co-
operation. To some extent this failure is due to the fact that some NGOs
have not been active enough in vindicating civic interests, while public offi-
cials are either not fully aware of their responsibilities or evade them with
impunity.
A Policy Forum is to be established within the frames of Coalition 2000 which
is to bring together government officials and representatives of non-govern-
mental institutions and other civic initiatives.
D.2.1. Background
The lack of steadfast efforts on behalf of the state to fill the void resulting
from the collapse of communism and its value system has led to misper-
ceptions about the complete independence of nascent market relations
from any moral imperatives. Meanwhile, the black economy has subjected
the game to its own rules, combining illegal activities with personal connec-
tions and corrupt practices. The emerging entrepreneurial class attempted
to revive pre-communist professional ethics but was forced into compliance
by strong pressure from the underground structures which were imposing
their own immoral methods of making fast profits. In addition to these ad-
verse factors, there have been various forms of politically motivated bias, se-
riously obstructing the adoption of objective professional criteria with regard
to public officials and those serving in the judicial system.
D.2.2. Objectives
The main objective is the revival of traditional professional associations and
professional ethics as an antithesis to corrupt behavior. Free choice, and
therefore ethics in labor relations and personal life, could only exist under
the conditions of democracy and a market economy. In this context, it is
necessary to create the proper means for encouraging ethical conduct and
denouncing the underground economy with its characteristic unlawful
forms of business and non-business relations.
D.2.3. Actions
D.2.3.1. Cooperation between the existing structures of civil society and the
emerging professional and industrial associations in devising and establish-
ing a professional code of conduct
There are already precedents in this respect. Various professional organiza-
tions are in the process of drafting their own codes of conduct. One such
example is the Code of Ethics of Judges in Bulgaria, according to which: Òthe
mission of the judge involves putting into practice the principle of justice
and impartiality.Ó
Codes of ethics should regulate both personal and professional conduct.
The existing NGOs should establish contacts with representatives of emerg-
ing professional associations, advise them as needed in the elaboration of
their professional codes of conduct, and generally involve them in partner-
ship and cooperation once they have been established.
D.2. Involving
professional
associations
and trade
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D.2.3.2. Creating effective mechanisms for sanctioning corrupt members of
professional associations
The creation of a mechanism for terminating membership in a professional
group for failure to comply with its code of ethics is an integral part of the
process of institutional development of professional associations. In this re-
spect, special provisions could be included in codes of ethics, and/or the
mechanism of public ostracism could be adopted in order to discredit cor-
rupt professionals in the eyes of public opinion.
D.2.3.3. Formulating and implementing initiatives aimed at enhancing the
standing and reputation of professional associations
It is necessary to restore the traditions in the various professions Ñ patron
days, charitable activities in connection with events important to the re-
spective profession, etc. Non-governmental organizations could help orga-
nize a series of public events dedicated to professional ethics and the need
to introduce modern standards in various spheres of social and political life.
The involvement of the media in promoting the new image of the Bulgarian
professional and entrepreneur and his/her professional organization as the
link between public administration, civil society and the private sector
would have a positive impact.
D.3.1. Background
Even while they are themselves targets of corruptive pressure, the mass me-
dia are the most important instrument in articulating the public interest.
There has as yet been no concerted effort of the media and the institutions
of civil society to counteract rampant corruption and crime. It is imperative
to coordinate the anti-corruption activities of the professional organizations
and associations of journalists with those of other NGOs.
D.3.2. Objectives
Useful steps towards establishing transparency in the media and journalism
would include shedding light on the methods and forms of corruption in this
sphere, adopting anti-corruption rules in the journalistic profession, and
publicizing those rules. These steps would also create the necessary pre-
conditions for more effective participation of independent media in the an-
ti-corruption campaign. The improved cooperation and coordination of me-
dia efforts are likely to result in stronger public pressure to limit corrupt prac-
tices in other spheres of public life.
D.3.3. Actions
D.3.3.1. Adopting basic anti-corruption rules for the journalistic profession
The drafting of the rules ought to be assigned to a working group consisting
of representatives of professional journalist organizations (the Union of
Bulgarian Journalists, Union of Journalists in Bulgaria) and associations (Civil
Forum Free Speech, the Center for Independent Journalism), as well as rep-
resentatives of lawyersÕ associations, editors, media owners, and members
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of the National Council on Radio and Television. It is necessary to provide
the general public with regular information on the progress of work on the
basic anti-corruption rules in journalism. The latter should be published and
reviewed in the mass media.
D.3.3.2. Establishing a special award for journalists with important contribu-
tions in the fight against corruption
On the one hand, the creation of such an award is motivated by the huge
public impact of impartial journalist investigations. On the other, by the
need to encourage and reward journalists who have taken up this risky
genre. Media coverage, the authority of the jury, and the form of the award
are crucial for giving it the desired high public status. The jury panel should
include leading journalists and eminent public figures, members of the po-
litical parties represented in parliament, as well as business representatives
of impeccable reputation.
D.3.3.3. Organizing courses for young journalists on the problems of cor-
ruption and the fight against corrupt practices
This is called for by the fact that at present the young generation in Bulgarian
media are making their professional debut in the absence of any further ca-
reer support and guidance as to how to resist corruptive pressure. It is rec-
ommended that the Department of Journalism and Mass Communications
at Sofia University and the Department of Mass Communications at New
Bulgarian University be involved in the design and organization of the cour-
ses.
D.3.3.4. Monitoring media coverage of the problems
of corruption
Media monitoring is aimed to measure the level of exposure of corruption
related problems in electronic and print media. Using the specific research
techniques, assessments about the influence of media environment on pub-
lic attitudes and opinions of different social groups are made. Media moni-
toring is also providing feedback about the media coverage of the initiatives
of Coalition 2000 and other similar civil society activities, aimed at curbing
corruption.
Media monitoring is conducted using a specially designed questionnaire,
and results are summarized and presented in the Index of Corruption.
D.4.1. Background
The present crisis in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the limited role of
other religious institutions in public life are the result of decades of commu-
nist suppression of religious practices and their social import. That is why the
efforts of religious leaders are mainly directed towards overcoming the neg-
ative trends within the clerical system itself and, to a lesser extent, towards
enhancing the role of the church in social life. This has had an adverse ef-
fect both on the church itself and the public at large in its search for moral
guidance and social behavior models in the post-communist period.
D.4. Cooperation
with religious
institutions
to foster
moral integri-
ty and coun-
teract corrup-
tion
40 Coalition 2000 Ñ Clean Future
D.4.2. Objectives
To help foster, on the basis of religious teachings about righteousness and
virtue, such moral criteria and behavior that condemn the various forms of
corruption and moral decay. Beyond this Action Plan, these efforts will con-
tribute towards the establishment of a new morality in a society currently
undergoing a process of democratization.
D.4.3. Actions
D.4.3.1. Establishing contacts and exchange of opinions between represen-
tatives of civic organizations and religious institutions on the issues of public
morals in the process of transition
It is important to seek effective ways of bridging the current gap between the
secular and religious organizations of civil society. One step in this direction
would be to organize a joint symposium which could trigger a broader pub-
lic discussion on cooperation in counteracting corruption.
D.4.3.2. Setting up a joint civic club involving both religious and secular ac-
tivists
In the longer term, it is possible to create a permanent forum of this kind,
providing opportunities for an ongoing exchange of opinions on important
social issues between representatives of the clergy, scholars, and human-
right activists. 
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E. FIFTH ACTION LINE:
CHANGING PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS OF
CORRUPTION
E.1.1. Background
The early and midÐ90s were marked by deeply destructive processes in
public consciousness, which further aggravated certain traditional flaws of
society. The delay of the reforms, political instability, and financial and eco-
nomic chaos created conditions which eroded the rule of law and led to a
decline in public morals. In mass consciousness, privatization thus came to
be identified with theft; and the use of, or the threat to use, force became
the established norm. At the same time, through the means of mass com-
munication, the public received ample information about the scope of cor-
ruption, particularly in the judicial system, including information about the
exact tariffs established for various, presumably free services. The wide-
spread practice of unlawful personal gain by public officials was becoming
ever more conspicuous among representatives of law-enforcement authori-
ties, in healthcare, customs, municipal and central government administra-
tion. The intertwining of the shadow economy and government and politi-
cal party structures deepens the feeling of resignation and cynicism among
a large part of Bulgarians. The various initiatives of civic organizations failed
to enlist broad public support and did not manage to catalyze negative atti-
tudes towards corruption. A change only occurred with the complete ex-
haustion of the neo-communist governance formula and the financial crisis
of the winter of 1997.
E.1.2. Objectives
The main objective in this respect is to provide further impetus to the posi-
tive changes already in progress in public consciousness, moving from resig-
nation to dissociation and resistance against the practices of organized crime
and corruption in its diverse manifestations. Catalyzing broad public oppo-
sition against corruption implies awareness of the phenomenon, of its
essence and workings, as well as of its consequences for the individual and
society as a whole. The formation of public intolerance against corruption
should also result in stronger public demands for institutional change guar-
anteeing transparency and accountability of the administration, as well as
for new moral standards in public life.
E.1.3. Actions
E.1.3.1. Social marketing of the anti-corruption campaign
The anti-corruption campaign is to be of national scope and of long-term
impact. It should be launched through the means of mass communication
E.1. Anti-corrup-
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and other public information channels. Its outset should be marked by pub-
licizing the Coalition 2000 anti-corruption project and the first forums
planned. To this end it will be necessary:
¥ to specify the subject of the campaign, its target audience and forms of
implementation. (Defining the term of corruption would help differentiate
in peopleÕs minds traditional expressions of gratitude from the unethical,
and often criminal act of bribery, as well as identify the less straightforward
forms of corruption);
¥ to determine the priority social groups within the framework of the cam-
paign, placing an emphasis on the younger audience without, however, ig-
noring other age groups;
¥ to make use of the most effective and tested forms of social marketing, in-
cluding audio-visual tools, posters, promotions, thematic campaigns, etc.;
¥ to devote special efforts to alerting young people to the problems and
threats posed by corruption. The youth-targeted campaign should build on
the experience from similar projects implemented in the past (e.g. the Say
No to Fear campaign), as well as the more successful traditional marketing
campaigns.
The campaign should include the following specific activities:
¥ designing and publicizing a logo, slogan, and poster of the campaign.
Their content should be determined in conformity with the priorities of the
campaign;
¥ producing and regularly broadcasting a TV and audio promotional mes-
sage. For this purpose it is necessary to secure the cooperation of public and
private electronic media managers in providing preferential terms of broad-
casting (similar to the way the radio spot on environmental protection was
distributed by the Association of Bulgarian Broadcasters);
¥ starting regular columns in several national newspapers. The publications
should generally foster a sense of a community of interests as defined by the
most esteemed representatives of the nation, beyond the narrow frames of
political life. The point of the articles would not be to offer explanations but
rather, to formulate a position, a common platform, backed by the person-
al authority of the commentator. This would in fact become a national dis-
cussion forum of sorts, with the various positions of prominent public figures
presented throughout the campaign;
¥ disseminating more information about the fight against corruption in oth-
er countries, as well as anti-corruption initiatives of international organiza-
tions;
¥ publication of brochures which are to familiarize the public with the var-
ious forms of corruption and the priorities of the fight against such practices;
¥ conducting Òdays against corruption,Ó for which purpose it will be neces-
sary to seek the assistance of central, and especially, local government au-
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thorities in organizing various events, concerts, competitions, etc. Those
events and the accompanying campaign messages will also be communi-
cated through the media;
¥ producing a television program with an anti-corruption message to be
broadcast on a regular basis (e.g., twice monthly) within the educational
programming of Bulgarian National Television. In order to attract broader
audiences it ought to be based on specific instances of corruption, all while
retaining a strong educational component (for instance, by relating the case
or problematic situation under consideration to specific instances and prac-
tices in the advanced Western democracies);
¥ maintaining a web page on the fight against corruption in Bulgaria.
This is called for by the fact that Bulgarians all too often prove to be unaware
of their rights and obligations in their interaction with state and municipal
administration. A number of services, which are free-of-charge by law and
to which citizens are therefore entitled, actually become paid not only be-
cause of corrupt officials but also because of the lack of information or pre-
conceived ideas of their clients. Furthermore, what is needed is not simply
a general awareness but rather, specific information about the conditions of
providing the respective service. The public education campaign is further
called for by the need for additional and accessible information about the
future regulations in this sphere after the adoption of the laws on public ad-
ministration and public officials.
The campaign could take the form of educational courses to be conducted
in selected municipalities. These courses would familiarize citizens with
their rights, the obligations of the Municipality and the functional distribu-
tion and provision of services on a municipal level.
The above-mentioned moral relativism with respect to specific corrupt prac-
tices is cultivated from the earliest age by way of bad examples and lack of
educational efforts to sustain the moral rectitude of the younger generations.
The campaign therefore envisions introducing a specialized course of lec-
tures on the problems of corruption in secondary and higher education.
Particular efforts will be made to find the most appealing forms of informa-
tion and education, using modern equipment and techniques, computer
games, etc.
¥ For the purposes of the educational campaign a handbook should be pre-
pared for the upper school grades which will contain a glossary with articles
on key terms. It will offer an accessible explanation of the functioning of the
state as an economic, political and social organism, about the budget, tax-
es, control and accountability, the role of key institutions, as well as civil
rights and obligations.
¥ A social and political cartoon competition with a subsequent exhibition in
Sofia and other cities should be organized. The exhibition will also be fea-
tured in newspapers and magazines. The project should be implemented in
cooperation with Sofia Municipality, private media, the Union of Artists, the
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association of cartoonists, the House of Humor and Satire in Gabrovo, and
others.
¥ In the higher education institutions the course could take place in the
form of written essay contests on corruption-related issues or other forms of
more intensive intellectual involvement of students.
As in the case of any social marketing campaign, this may also provoke cer-
tain negative reactions, which need to be predicted and defused by limiting
their scope. Since the issue of corruption does not appear to have an im-
mediate bearing on the basic needs of Bulgarians, it will be difficult for the
message to make its way to their consciousness.
The greatest obstacle to achieving the desired impact with the campaign is
the unappealing nature of its subject and the publicÕs weariness of direct
propaganda. It is therefore necessary to use non-traditional forms of social
marketing striking the proper balance between accessibility and originality.
The one thing to avoid at all cost is boredom, unattractiveness and tradi-
tionalism in the implementation of the campaign.
There is reason to expect serious behind-the-scenes opposition, including
through the mass media, from the circles affected by the anti-corruption
campaign.
It is also necessary to bear in mind the risk of politicization of the campaign.
This could take place either by way of identifying anti-corruption actions
with narrow party interests or through attempts to limit their scope in the
service of the political or individual interests of certain parties or leaders.
E.4. Expected ob-
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F. SIXTH ACTION LINE:
INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
F.1.1. Background
Corruption has become a world phenomenon with immediate implications
not only for the economic development of individual countries and their in-
ternational relations, but likewise for the world economy and politics in gen-
eral. The international community is thus becoming increasingly aware of
the need for democratization and openness as conditions for successful eco-
nomic development. The goal of international forums concerned with the
threat of corruption is to counteract it through a positive program enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of government while reaffirming individual freedoms
and human rights. Such has also been the trend of the changes occurring in
public consciousness with the introduction of the new information tech-
nologies.
The various international organizations approach the problem of counter-
acting corruption from different angles. For the UN, and more specifically
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the starting point is
good governance aimed at securing sustainable development; for the World
Bank, the approach to corruption is primarily linked to economic develop-
ment in general; the Council of Europe places an emphasis on the multidis-
ciplinary approach; the European Union sees the problem of corruption as
one chiefly related to protecting the financial interests of the Community
and the normal functioning of the market with competition as one of its fun-
daments; within OECD there are four major areas of concern, with the fore-
most being fighting bribery in international business transactions. It is in this
same area that the World Trade Organization can be expected to concen-
trate its efforts in the coming years.
Different countries also tend to approach the problem in different ways.
While the United States Agency for International Development sets democ-
racy and good governance as priorities in the fight against corruption, the
British Department for International Development tends to associate it
chiefly with the fight against poverty.
The various approaches reflect the complexity of the phenomenon of cor-
ruption and the difficulties in seeking solutions on a national and interna-
tional level. In this sense, cooperation with and among international organi-
zations is necessary not only to avoid duplication, but also in order to
achieve the desired lasting effect.
BulgariaÕs cooperation with the international organizations concerned with
this problem is still lagging behind the countryÕs need for support in coun-
teracting corruption. It would appear that there is as yet no adequate ap-
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preciation of the individual approach of each of the various international or-
ganizations and hence, of the different possibilities for cooperation. On the
other hand, the legal and institutional curbing of corruption in Bulgaria
would constitute a serious contribution towards the success of integration
efforts within the process of accession to the European Union, towards es-
tablishing stable and predictable relations with the international financial in-
stitutions, as well as towards attracting substantial foreign investments.
F.1.2. Objectives
Bulgaria should primarily strive to ensure these two interrelated precondi-
tions for curbing corruption: a) enlisting international support for the efforts
to combat the phenomenon in this country, both in terms of international
experience and know-how, and financial assistance for the administrative
reform, and b) active involvement in the international efforts to limit the
negative implications of corruption for regional and world economy and
politics.
F.1.3. Actions:
F.1.3.1. Optimizing cooperation within the framework of the United
Nations
The problems related to corruption have been on the UN agenda for more
than two decades. The UN General Assembly endorses a number of docu-
ments of consequence for undertaking effective measures against corrup-
tion.
Within the UN, the Commission for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
plays an important role for establishing and developing international coop-
eration in this area.
As a specialized donor institution, UNDP also has a significant interest in
overcoming corruption as a condition of achieving its goals Ñ reducing
poverty, building a society oriented towards the individual, ensuring sus-
tainable development. A Programme for Accountability and Transparency
(1996) was elaborated within UNDP, making aid to the countries in need
contingent on improving governance and limiting corrupt practices.
Cooperation of Bulgaria with the UN should be optimized along several
lines:
¥ to make use of the opportunities provided by the UN Secretariat; specif-
ically, the technical assistance provided to member countries for enhancing
their capability to develop and effectively implement an anti-corruption pol-
icy and strategy;
¥ to activate relations with UNDP which is also closely involved in interna-
tional efforts to curb corruption. It is necessary to draw on UNDP experi-
ence in supporting national justice administration systems, public and pri-
vate sector management, decentralization of administrative activity, and the
building up of civil society. These priorities stem from the belief that im-
proved governance and institutional advancement in the developing
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economies are preconditions for sustainable human development. Future
cooperation with UNDP should make full use of its potential in terms of col-
laborative interaction not only with developing countries, but also with gov-
ernment institutions and independent civil society structures;
¥ to undertake measures for the broad dissemination of the documents en-
dorsed by the world organization for use within the national legislation of
each member country;
¥ to identify possibilities for using the experience, technical and financial
assistance of the UN in the implementation of the present Anti-Corruption
Action Plan;
¥ to promote more active involvement of Bulgaria in the activity of the in-
tergovernmental group of experts working to develop a comprehensive in-
ternational convention against organized cross-border crime, which was set
up with resolution 52/85 of the UN General Assembly.
F.1.3.2. Extending interaction with the European Union
The European Commission Communication of May 21, 1997 to the Council
and European Parliament on combatting corruption, contains the main pol-
icy guidelines, for both member and non-member countries (including
those of Central and Eastern Europe, with respect to which the implemen-
tation of special programs is recommended).
An Action Plan Against Organized Crime was drawn up by the High Level
Group and adopted at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997,
which along with other matters recommended the implementation of a
global policy against corruption with the aim of enhancing openness in pub-
lic administration, and emphasized the importance of cooperation with the
UnionÕs main partners, in particular with applicant countries.
The European Union has adopted a number of regulations which allow the
authorities to avoid entering into contractual relations with companies or
enterprises associated with improper conduct or the practice of accepting or
giving bribes.
In recent years, the Council of Ministers has endorsed two multilateral in-
ternational instruments which have been integrated into the Community
law and are particularly related to the problem of corruption in the
Community and among the officials of the member statesÕ administrations.
With a view to the need for harmonizing Bulgarian legislation with EU law
as an essential element of the countryÕs preparation for EU accession, the
following measures ought to be considered:
¥ bringing Bulgarian legislation in line with the Protocol to the Convention
on the Protection of the Financial Interests of the Community, adopted on
27 September 1996, which provides for member states to criminalize the ac-
tive and passive corruption involving officials of the Community and public
officials in the member countries which affects the financial interests of the
Community;
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¥ gradual alignment of legislation with the Convention on Combating
Corruption Involving Officials of the Community and Public Officials in the
EU Member Countries, ratified by the Council on May 26, 1997. According
to the Convention, all member states are to criminalize active and passive
corruption involving officials of the Community and public officials in the EU
member countries, regardless of whether the financial interests of the
Community are affected.
¥ drawing on the experience of individual EU member states in the fight
against corruption on a political level, both in terms of legislation and the ju-
diciary;
¥ full use of Òthird pillarÓ cooperation and the funds extended under the
various EU programs for the introduction and implementation of anti-cor-
ruption measures and related reforms in the administration, and more no-
tably with regard to tax and customs authorities.
F.1.3.3. Participation in cooperation under the auspices of the Council of
Europe
In recent years, the efforts of the Council of Europe have been directed to-
wards the development of a common penal policy for combating corrup-
tion. The main guidelines of the Programme of Action against Corruption for
the period 1996Ð2000, created by the Multidisciplinary Group on
Corruption (GMC), concern elaborating a definition of corruption, criminal-
izing the acts of corruption, devising a code of conduct, introducing civil li-
ability for corruption, defining the role and responsibilities of institutions and
individual persons, and proposing measures for preventing and combating
corruption.
Significant impetus in this respect was provided by the 21st Conference of
European Justice Ministers (Prague, 10Ð11 June, 1997). The Second Summit
of Heads of State and Government (10Ð11 October, 1997) considered pro-
posals for establishing a body on cooperation, technical assistance and in-
formation exchange aimed at preventing corruption, as well as for the in-
troduction of legal standards for tougher anti-corruption measures. At its 13th
meeting (23Ð27 March, 1998) GMC adopted a draft convention on corrup-
tion providing for measures on a national level, implementation control, and
guidelines of international cooperation.
In its cooperation with the Council of Europe, Bulgaria should be guided by
the following objectives:
¥ further active participation in the work of the Multidisciplinary Group on
Corruption and the elaboration and adoption of the international legal in-
struments drafted by the Group: Penal Law Convention on Corruption,
Partial Agreement Establishing the Group of States against Corruption Ñ
GRECO, the European Code of Conduct of Public Officials;
¥ completion of the process of establishing the appropriate legal framework
for adoption of the above instruments, subject to their approval by the
Council of Europe;
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¥ full implementation of the Final Recommendations and Guidelines for
Action made to the Bulgarian Government under the Octopus Project of the
European Commission and the Council of Europe of September 24, 1998.
On a domestic level, it is necessary to undertake the following measures in
line with the instruments endorsed by the Council of Europe:
¥ criminalizing bribery of foreign public officials;
¥ criminalizing the so-called Òtrade in influenceÓ;
¥ enhancing the administrative capacity of the specialized anti-corruption
agencies;
¥ elaborating and implementing witness protection programs including ap-
propriate financial and other provisions;
¥ creating a public register for annual property and income declarations by
senior public officials;
¥ improving inter-institutional cooperation and statistics;
¥ developing educational programs aimed at fostering a culture of public
ethics and rule of law.
F.2.1. Background
In recent years the international economic, financial, and trade institutions
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, and others) initiated a debate on corruption
and its impact on global economic relations, as well as on the economies of
the developing and post-communist countries. It was largely under their in-
fluence that a number of anti-corruption documents were endorsed and
adopted by the advanced democracies as mandatory in their foreign eco-
nomic practice.
OECD has taken up very seriously the issue of the corruptibility of officials
in international business. A significant contribution to the development of a
global strategy and specific measures to combat corruption has also been
made by the World Bank and its Economic Development Institute. In recent
years the IMF has also adopted a policy of greater commitment to trans-
parency as a condition of macro-economic stabilization.
F.2.2. Objectives
To extend BulgariaÕs cooperation with international economic, financial,
and trade institutions with the aim of curbing this phenomenon in the
Bulgarian economy, as well as attracting additional financial support for ef-
forts to enhance the effectiveness and guarantee the transparency of gover-
nance.
F.2.3. Actions
F.2.3.1. Joint activity with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)
F.2. International
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The fight against corruption in international business is one of the principal
goals of OECD. The organization has four main areas of activity Ñ fighting
bribery in international business transactions, enhancing anti-corruption sys-
tems within the frames of public administration, controlling externally fund-
ed projects, and studying corruption in non-member states. The Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions was signed on 21 November, 1997 and Bulgaria is a party to
this instrument.
The OECD member states are the source of approximately 70% of the
goods and services in the world and about 70% of international exports, and
generate about 90% of investments on a global scale. Cooperation within
OECD in combating corruption in international business transactions, which
also involves the participation of non-member states (Argentina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Chile), is therefore of vital import to the successful coun-
teraction of international corruption.
In the future, cooperation within OECD will seek to extend the scope of the
fight against corruption by combating bribery of representatives of foreign
political parties or candidates for office, as well as by examining the role of
subsidiaries abroad and offshore centers.
It is indispensable for Bulgaria to become fully involved in the international
cooperation in combating corruption under the auspices of OECD, which
implies the following:
¥ full participation in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International
Business Transactions. Bulgaria has so far not been effectively involved in its
activity even though this was the first OECD working body of which the
country became a full member;
¥ active involvement in the monitoring mechanism of the implementation
of the Convention and the Revised Recommendations of OECD, which in-
cludes a system of self-evaluation measures based on questionnaires as well
as a system of mutual evaluation of the working group member countries;
¥ fulfillment of the commitments undertaken with the signing and ratifica-
tion of the Convention: changes in the Penal Code for the purpose of crim-
inalizing bribery of foreign public officials according to the definitions of
bribery and foreign public official set forth in the Convention; introducing
provisions for non-criminal penalties for legal entities engaged in bribery of
foreign officials; taking steps in connection with money laundering and ac-
counting requirements;
¥ adherence to the Revised Recommendation of the Council of OECD of
23 May 1997 and the Recommendation of the Council of 11 April 1996;
¥ participation in future cooperation within the frames of the OECD
Working Group on Combating International Corruption;
¥ appropriate support for the efforts of the OECD Public Management
Committee Ñ PUMA in connection with the elaborated Ethics Checklist
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and the related research currently in progress, as well as with its other activ-
ities aimed at preventing and combating corruption.
F.2.3.2. Interaction with the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund
Interaction with international financial institutions and, more specifically,
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, should be aimed at
implementing the common goals of curbing corrupt practices within the
frames of Bulgarian reforms and privatization.
The systematic framework for addressing corruption as a development issue
in the assistance provided by the World Bank was developed in the 1997 re-
port ÒHelping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World BankÓ.
The Bank will respond to requests for assistance in partnership with other in-
ternational institutions and bilateral aid donors as appropriate. In other cas-
es, the Bank may provide assistance in economic policy reform and institu-
tional strengthening that, while aimed primarily at improving government
performance, also helps reduce corruption.
Of particular interest with regard to governance is the document endorsed
by the IMF Executive Board on 4 August, 1997, which contains the criteria
for IMF involvement in this respect. The document expressly notes that the
responsibility for governance lies with the national authorities and IMF in-
volvement is warranted in instances when the capacity of the respective
government to conduct a viable economic and financial policy is impaired
by poor governance, with a resulting negative impact on macro-economic
performance, for instance due to misuse of public funds, widespread bribery
of tax and customs officers, etc.
More active cooperation would be particularly beneficial in the following
spheres:
¥ with the IMF in the sphere of combating international money laundering.
In this area Bulgaria should seek technical assistance for the consistent ap-
plication of licensing and financial-accounting requirements, as well as in
the elaboration of banking and foreign exchange legislation and regulations;
¥ with the international financial institutions in general, insofar as they sup-
port the efforts of the various countries to improve governance by enhanc-
ing transparency and remodeling government practices in such areas as tax
policy and administration, the financial system, public expenditure policy
and management, etc.;
¥ drawing on the experience of international financial institutions in the
sphere of fiscal corruption, remuneration of public sector employees and
corruption, as well as with respect to the impact of corruption on growth,
capital accumulation and the cost of governance;
¥ establishing partnering relations between Bulgarian non-governmental or-
ganizations and international financial and trade organizations. Bulgarian
NGOs should be more active in supporting the implementation of the anti-
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corruption strategy of the international financial organizations, as well as the
recommended measures for greater transparency and accountability.
F.2.3.3. Cooperation with the International Chamber of Commerce
The International Chamber of Commerce plays an important role in stimu-
lating international economic relations and trade in particular. In 1996 it
adopted a revised version of Rules of Conduct in the Fight against Extortion
and Bribery in International Business Transactions. However, these rules are
not mandatory and corporations are free to decide whether to endorse
them.
It is important for Bulgaria to follow closely the developments concerning
the application of these standards, all the more that a special committee has
been set up on a permanent basis with the participation of business persons,
legal experts, and academics, to continue efforts in this direction.
F.3.1. Background
International non-governmental organizations, professional associations,
not-for-profit organizations and other third-sector structures will be playing
an increasingly important role in the fight against corruption. The key ob-
jective at this stage is to identify potential partners and possibilities for co-
operation, as well as the specific areas where it would be most viable.
F.3.2. Objectives
Cooperation with non-governmental organizations falls within the principal
goal of implementing anti-corruption activities and should take into account
the potential, as well as the limitations, of these organizations deriving from
their specific nature.
F.3.3. Actions
Cooperation should be established primarily with organizations likely to of-
fer substantial support, including financial assistance, for the implementa-
tion of the Action Plan, such as:
¥ The International Development Law Institute (IDLI), Rome
The International Development Law Institute is an international not-for-
profit organization established by inter-governmental agreement of 13
countries, including Bulgaria. IDLI is a leading European organization in the
sphere of legal development and has extensive experience in implementing
legal training programs in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as
well as in developing countries.
Cooperation with IDLI proceeds in two main directions:
a) using the resources and experience of the Institute in implementing the
public awareness campaign;
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b) acting, in cooperation with the Institute, on the recommendations made
in the present action plan concerning the need to enhance the practical
skills of Bulgarian jurists.
¥ Transparency International
A particularly important aspect of cooperation with Transparency
International, which has recently established a Bulgarian Chapter, is to study
its experience in the elaboration of an international index for assessing cor-
ruption.
F.4.1. Background
Due to its specific development dynamic and low level of integration, the
region of South-Eastern Europe is characterized by relatively weak coordi-
nation in combating corruption. The war in former Yugoslavia and the on-
going ethnic tension in some of the newly established states, the problems
related to the transition to market economy in most of those countries, to-
gether with the lacking or underdeveloped legal and institutional framework
for combating corruption are major factors making it imperative that the
countries of the region join their efforts (on a bilateral and multilateral basis)
in combating this negative social phenomenon. In this respect it is vital to
start with the recognition of interdependence and the combined manifesta-
tion of cross-border organized crime and the corruption of public officials,
specifically those in charge of border and customs control.
The Republic of Bulgaria is involved in a number of regional forms of coop-
eration: Process on Stability and Good Neighborliness in Southeastern
Europe (the Royaumont Process), Southeast European Cooperation
Initiative (SECI), Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Central European
Initiative (CEI). Bulgaria is the initiator of the process of fostering good neigh-
borly relations, stability, security, and cooperation in the Balkans and ac-
tively participates in trilateral formats of cooperation with Greece, Turkey
and Romania. A dialogue for cooperation in combating corruption has only
begun in three of the regional initiatives Ñ SECI, BSEC, and the trilateral di-
alogue.
F.4.2. Objectives
The main goal is full involvement of Bulgaria in the regional forums and ini-
tiatives on counteracting corruption, which could help turn them into work-
ing international instruments for curbing the phenomenon that poses a par-
ticular threat to this region.
F.4.3. Actions
F.4.3.1. Within the framework of Black Sea Economic Cooperation
A draft is currently being discussed of an intergovernmental Agreement of
the BSEC Member Countries for Cooperation in Combating Crime and the
Related Organized Forms. The Bulgarian side is represented in the negotia-
tions by officials from the Ministry of the Interior. To date agreement has
F.4. Regional or-
ganizations and
initiatives
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been reached on the title, preamble, and articles 1, 2, and 3 of the treaty.
No measures for collective efforts in combating corruption have been con-
sidered so far.
F.4.3.2. Within the framework of the Initiative for Cooperation in South-
Eastern Europe
In compliance with the decision of the Sixth Program Committee (PC) of
SECI (15 April 1998) in Bucharest, two meetings have been held (6 May and
3 June 1998) of the working groups on the project for the creation of a
Center for Combating Crime and Corruption. The project will emphasize
specific cooperation with respect to cross-border organized crime and cor-
ruption. The present stage involves defining the subject and area of activity
of the Center, its structure and operation principles. The following areas of
cooperation have been outlined on a preliminary basis:
¥ building up an integrated system of information exchange (data base) and
rules for its use;
¥ operative cooperation in the prosecution of persons charged with cor-
ruption;
¥ legal regulation of the issue of extradition of persons involved in crimes;
¥ document and witness protection.
The proposal to delegate representatives of the participating countries to the
Center will probably be adopted in order to ensure its effective functioning.
It would be most appropriate for those representatives to be legal experts
from the respective authorities concerned with combating corruption.
Two further documents (Memorandum and Charter) for cooperation in
combating organized crime and corruption are to be signed by the end of
1998 within the frames of SECI.
F.5.1. Background
The Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Bulgaria, in its capacity as cen-
tral law-enforcement authority, has signed agreements for cooperation with
all the countries of the region with the exception of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. The ratification of the treaty with Croatia is forthcoming and, un-
like those with the other countries, it has been signed as an intergovern-
mental treaty. A common characteristic of all of those agreements is the em-
phasis on combating organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, illegal arms
trade and trafficking in human beings. However, there is little or no refer-
ence to cooperation in combating corruption.
F.5.2. Objectives
Curbing corruption will allow the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and
each of the countries of Southeastern Europe to develop in conformity with
their common interests and priorities. Furthermore, cross-border coopera-
tion would help national authorities in each country deal more successfully
F.5. Regional co-
operation on
a multilateral
and bilateral
basis
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with the fight against organized crime. Of particularly great import is the
elimination of cross-border crime (trafficking in drugs, human beings, and
arms).
F.5.3. Actions:
F.5.3.1. It is necessary to analyze the bilateral treaties signed by the law-en-
forcement authorities and include a collaborative element with regard to
combating corruption through special protocols
F.5.3.2. It would be important to create a national integrated information
system on combating corruption and link it to corresponding systems in
neighboring countries
F.6.1. Background
Implementing effective anti-corruption measures in Bulgaria calls for the use
of the expertise and other similar resources of the countries with advanced
market economies and democratic systems based on the rule of law. In this
sense, the said measures should comprise a mechanism for cooperation
with the USA, the EU member states, Japan, and other countries. More
specifically, this could be achieved through existing government aid institu-
tions Ñ United States Agency for International Development, the British
Know-How Fund, and others. The 1998Ð2002 Strategic Plan of USAID in
Bulgaria devotes special attention to the fight against corruption. The im-
portance has been highlighted of promoting the involvement of civil society
organizations in fostering greater public awareness and negative attitudes to-
wards corruption in this country.
F.6.2. Objectives
The cooperation with government aid institutions would ensure that the ex-
pertise and experience of government authorities and non-governmental
organizations in the developed countries is available for the implementation
of the present set of measures.
F.6.3. Actions
F.6.3.1. The areas covered by the present Action Plan where technical and
financial assistance from government aid institutions is most urgently need-
ed are about to be identified
F.6.3.2. It is necessary to develop and implement a coordination mechanism
with local offices of the bilateral donor agencies to coordinate the imple-
mentation of the Action Plan
F.6.3.3. Cooperation ought to be ensured in involving government and non-
government experts from the respective countries in regular monitoring of
the progress made by Bulgaria in the fight against corruption
F.6. Cooperation
with govern-
ment aid insti-
tutions on a
bilateral basis
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CORRUPTION MONITORING
SYSTEM

COALITION 2000
CORRUPTION INDICES

Coalition 2000 Corruption Indices 61
METHODOLOGY
The corruption indices are constructed based on survey data of Vitosha
Research with the Center for the Study of Democracy and are among the
basic output results of the Corruption Monitoring System (CMS).
The development of the CMS began with the first quantitative survey on cor-
ruption in March 1997. In the period till September 1998 a total of 5 quan-
titative and 4 qualitative surveys have been conducted.
Based on the experience gained, in the period July-September 1998 the first
surveys (2 quantitative and 3 qualitative) of the CMS have been conducted.
The present issue of the Corruption Indices of Coalition 2000 is based on
these recent surveys.
The methodology of the CMS envisions periodic monitoring of a set of indi-
cators characterizing the way in which citizens and public sector employees
perceive corruption and also their involvement in different forms of corrupt
practices.
CORRUPTION INDICES
Corruption indices are among the important outputs of the Corruption
Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000. Their values will be updated
quarterly based on survey data.
Corruption assessment index numbers assume values from 0Ð10.
The closer the value of the index is to 10, the more negative are the assess-
ments of the state of corruption. Index numbers closer to 0 indicate ap-
proximation to the ideal of a Òcorruption-freeÓ society.
Corruption indices have been grouped into several categories:
¥ Attitudes towards corruption;
¥ Corrupt practices;
¥ Assessments of the scope of corruption;
¥ Corruption-related expectations.
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CORRUPTION INDICES:
STRUCTURE AND
INTERPRETATION
1. Attitudes
Acceptability Indicates the level of moral acceptance of various
in Principle corrupt practices.
Susceptibility Measures the inclination to compromise on 
to corruption values and principles under the pressure of circum-
stances.
2. Corrupt
Practices
Corruption Indicates the frequency of attempts to corrupt
pressure public officials
Personal Self-assessment / admission of the frequency of
involvement in involvement in different forms of corrupt 
corrupt practices behavior
3. Assessments
of the spread
of corrupt
practices
Spread of Indicates citizensÕ assessments of the spread of
corruption corrupt practices among public officials
Practical Indicates citizensÕ assessments of the extent to
effectiveness which corruption is becoming an efficient tool of
solving personal problems and a social norm of be-
havior.
4. Corruption
Expectations
Expectations Assessment of the potential of Bulgarian society to
cope with corruption.
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THE SOCIAL MEANING OF
CORRUPTION INDICES
Corruption indices provide an approximation about the scope and the aspects
of corruption based on the assessments of citizens and public officials. These
assessments are the starting point for their practical behavior and the way
they perceive their social environment.
Corruption indices could not be a base for making direct conclusions about
the exact level of proliferation of corrupt practices.
Closest to the dimension level of proliferation of corruption is the index of per-
sonal involvement in corrupt practices, as it is based on the anonymous ad-
missions by respondents about their involvement in acts of corrupt behav-
ior.
To a certain extent the specific legal characteristics of corruption (that both
sides act illegally) makes the index of personal involvement in corrupt prac-
tices one of the few realistic measures of the actual level of proliferation of cor-
ruption.
Currently, the accuracy level of empirical survey estimates of the realities of
corruption is substantially higher Ñ for obvious reasons Ñ in comparison
with the available information from law enforcement institutions.
VALUES OF CORRUPTION INDICES
1. Attitudes towards corruption
Acceptability in principle Susceptibility to corruption
Population Public officialsPopulation
¥ Corruption is perceived as a social evil.
There is a large measure of agreement
among Bulgarians that corruption is unac-
ceptable in principle.
¥ Reality versus values.
Susceptibility to corruption rises seriously
when values are confronted with personal
interest. People are inclined to compro-
mise their principles because they do not
see any other way of achieving their goals.
¥ The low level of acceptability of corrup-
tion on the one hand, and the high level of
susceptibility, on the other, together shape
the following widely accepted practical
philosophy concerning corruption: corrup-
tion is a necessary evil which in practice
gets things done.
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¥ Corruption is not the outcome of open coercion.
Individual corruption pressure is relatively low. This suggests that
in Bulgaria corrupt behavior is generated not so much by social
pressure but, rather, by vested interest and necessity.
Corruption pressure
Population Public officials
Personal involvement
in corrupt practices
Population Public officials
2. Corrupt practices
¥ Not everyone is personally involved in corruption.
The index of corrupt practices is higher among public officials
than among the population in general.
The data show that the cases of participation in various forms of
corrupt practices do not encompass the majority of the citizens.
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3. Assessments of the spread of corrupt practices
Spread of corruption
Population Public officials
Practical effectiveness
of corruption
Population
¥ Corrupt practices are perceived as widespread and com-
monplace.
The Bulgarian public tends to perceive corruption as a wide-
spread phenomenon which is about to turn into a social
norm.
¥ Involvement in corrupt practices is socially successful.
This value attitude coexists with the general view, confirmed
on a daily basis, that corruption is in fact a highly efficient
tool for solving personal problems.
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Expectations
Population
4. Corruption expectations
¥ Corruption will be difficult to eliminate in the foresee-
able future.
With regard to the possibility for society to resolve the prob-
lem of corruption, Bulgarians are not resigned to the worst
but rather tend to be moderately pessimistic.
The value of the index suggests that Bulgarians could possi-
bly change their future expectations in case the social envi-
ronment succeeds in fostering legitimate mechanisms that
would pay off better than those of corruption.
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CONCLUSIONS
¥ The Bulgarian public regards corruption as one of the three most signifi-
cant problems faced by our society.
¥ There is broad consensus that corruption is a social evil.
¥ Practical circumstances modify the basic intolerance of corruption and it
comes to be perceived as a necessary evil.
¥ The principle unacceptability of corruption is eroded by the deeply root-
ed belief that corrupt practices are highly effective in dealing with problem-
atic situations.
¥ Many people admit that when confronted with the reality of pressure and
temptation they would compromise over their values. This choice is sup-
ported by the conviction that corruption is turning into a social norm.
¥ The customs and tax administration, the judicial system, the central ex-
ecutive and the legislative branches of government, healthcare, the police,
and the municipal administration are considered the main centers of cor-
ruption among public sector employees.
¥ Citizens assess as quite high the extent to which our society has been in-
fected with the virus of corruption. This pessimistic view is based on three
popularly shared perceptions:
Ð that corruption is widespread among public officials;
Ð that it is a successful practice both for the corrupting and the corrupted;
Ð that it is virtually unpunishable.
¥ In mass consciousness there predominates the moderately optimistic atti-
tude that corruption could be curbed, and that it is less widespread than
could be expected in view of its being a successful and unpunishable social
instrument.
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SUMMARY: THE CORRUPTION
INDICES OF COALITION 2000
Acceptability: There is consensus in Bulgarian soci-
ety that corruption is a social evil.
Pressure: Without constituting mass practice, the
corruption pressure occurring between citizens and
public officials is considerable.
Involvement: Corrupt practices on the part of citi-
zens and public officials are mutually inducing and
all too often assume the nature of a mutually prof-
itable ÒdealÓ.
The susceptibility of some citizens to corruption is
justified by the pressure of circumstances and the
absence of alternatives.
Efficiency: Bulgarian citizens believe that corruption
is widespread in our society and constitutes an effi-
cient tool for solving personal problems.
Spread: Even though corruption in this country is as-
sessed as significant in size, it is perceived as less
widespread than could be expected in view of its be-
ing highly effective and virtually unpunishable.
Expectations: While they remain skeptical,
Bulgarians are inclined to think that even if in-
evitable, corruption may be curbed in the near fu-
ture.
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Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000 includes a system of
empirical studies and analytical reports. The main objective of CMS is to pe-
riodically present information, which would enable conclusions about the
scope of corruption in the country, as well about the related public atti-
tudes, assessments and expectations.
I. COALITION 2000 INITIATIVE
AND CORRUPTION
MONITORING SYSTEM
The main objective of the anti-corruption initiative of Coalition 2000 is the
enhancement of public intolerance towards corruption as an element of the de-
mocratic values and practical implementation of mechanisms which lead to
greater transparency, trust, and integrity. This will be achieved by develop-
ing an Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Bulgaria (AP), conducting an Anti-
Corruption Awareness Campaign and implementing the Corruption
Monitoring System (CMS). The CMS is based on regularly conducted em-
pirical studies.
In greater detail the Coalition 2000 initiative will aim to:
¥ Promote public awareness of corruption and establish mechanisms to support
anti-corruption efforts through public education, advocacy and dissemina-
tion of information.
¥ Assist democratic institution building, promotion of democratic values, and elab-
oration of an anti-corruption Action Plan by organizing panels of experts and
legislators to develop amendments to the institutional arrangements and
regulatory framework that help restrain corruption, particularly among pub-
lic officials.
¥ Serve as a ÒwatchdogÓ of the reform process, focusing attention on practical
implementation of transparent and clear rules of the game, integrity, and
democratic control.
The model of impact chosen by Coalition 2000 aimed at curbing corruption
could be produced following a three stage process including: cognitive
change (this involves problem diagnostics and formulation of a research-
based impact strategy); inducing affect (this is the process of converting mes-
sages into emotional/moral commitments); behavior change (this involves in-
ducing people to change some aspects of their actual behavior and trans-
forming moral disapproval into an action agenda of the public).
The model includes three basic targets of an anti-corruption campaign
which address the principle factors of corruption: monopoly (which in the
case of Bulgaria is the predominance of the state in the economy and other
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sectors of social life), discretionary power (i.e. the lack of clear administrative
rules and regulations) and accountability (i.e. poor functioning of watchdog
agencies or lack of such agencies).
The Coalition 2000 process is structured in three main components
where the CMS is designed to perform several specific functions:
Component 1: Corruption Assessment and Development of an
Anti-Corruption Action Plan
Corruption Diagnostics. The first CMS panel of surveys is to be conducted
at the initial stage of the project. At this initial stage, the CMS will be the ma-
jor diagnostic tool. It will help evaluate the status of corruption in different ar-
eas of public life and to map the specific characteristics of the perceptions
of the general public, public officials, experts, and political decision makers.
The findings of the first surveys are to be presented to the group of experts
who are drafting the Anti-Corruption Action Plan. The major function of the
CMS in the initial stage of the project is to help experts in the drafting
process.
Corruption Assessment. The full analysis of the findings produced from the
first CMS panel of surveys will be presented in the Corruption Assessment
Report (CAR). The CAR will be prepared on a yearly basis and presented at
the Public Policy Forum. In addition to corruption assessment the second
and third CAR will evaluate the progress made in curbing corruption and in-
fluencing public perceptions and attitudes.
Component 2: Anti-Corruption Awareness Campaign
All the activities of Coalition 2000 under this component could be divided in-
to two basic groups:
¥ A system of activities aimed at changing public attitudes towards corrup-
tion. The awareness campaign is intended to promote public awareness of
corruption and to create in Bulgarian society a climate of rejection of corruption.
¥ Practical action-based pilot initiatives, which could test the effectiveness
of various anti-corruption normative and socio-psychological mechanisms in a
specific region and/or settlement.
The CMS surveys are to be conducted in the course of the activities associ-
ated with this component. Their functions related to this specific compo-
nent are:
Targeting. Surveys included in the CMS will help identify specific target au-
diences (based on attitudes and perceptions) for the practical initiatives of
Coalition 2000. The CMS will also help identify the most effective media
channels for reaching the specific audiences.
Message design. Some of the CMS surveys are specifically targeted at test-
ing and tailoring the messages of Coalition 2000. This will help the awareness
campaign achieve maximum efficiency.
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Analysis of patterns of corrupt behavior. CMS survey results and analysis
will be one of the essential content elements of the awareness campaign. In
this respect the CMS will be a major provider of analysis aimed at generat-
ing public debate on corruption issues in Bulgarian society.
Component 3: Monitoring of corruption and corrupt behavior
The basic functions of the CMS itself are related to its major outputs: the
Corruption Indices of Coalition 2000 and the Corruption Assessment
Report.
Corruption indices are based on the surveys included in the CMS and will
summarize the most important corruption indicator variables to evalu-
ate/measure the level of proliferation of corrupt practices in different
spheres of society. The Corruption Indices of Coalition 2000 will be pub-
lished four times a year.
The Corruption Assessment Report is to be published yearly and will sum-
marize the results of all the CMS surveys conducted during the year.
In addition, the other functions of the CMS are:
¥ To provide reliable feedback about the effectiveness of the anti-corruption
initiatives of Coalition 2000;
¥ To maintain, on the basis of the collected information, regular feedback
with the relevant institutions in order to support the implementation of mech-
anisms that would constrain corrupt practices.
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II. IMPROVEMENT OF THE
CORRUPTION MONITORING
SYSTEM
The process of CMS methodology development
Methodology and results of the CMS are submitted for evaluation to the
members of an Expert Council established with Coalition 2000. The CMS
components and outputs are to be developed according to the recommen-
dations of the experts, thus producing changes in the initial design and struc-
ture of the CMS.
Members of the Expert Council are leading public opinion researchers and
sociologists in the country, as well as representatives of the state administra-
tion:
Antonii Todorov Director, Institute for Social Values and Structures
Assen Yosiffov Director, National Public Opinion Research
Center
Blagovest Georgiev Associate Professor, Department of Sociology,
Sofia University ÒCliment OhridskiÓ
Boyan Stankov Deputy Chair, Council for Criminal Studies, Chief
Prosecution Office
Dimitar Bachvarov Head, Structural Reform Department, Councils of
Ministers
Evgenii Dainov Director, Center for Social Practices
Georgi Fotev Director, Institute of Sociology, Bulgarian
Academy of Sciences
Irena Angelova Legal Adviser, Ministry of Internal Affairs
Ivan Chalukov Deputy Director, Institute of Sociology, Bulgarian
Academy of Sciences
Krastyuo Petkov Professor, Department of Sociology, Sofia
University ÒCliment OhridskiÓ
Mihail Mirchev General Manager, ASSA-M Ltd.
Miroslava Yanova Director, MBMD Ltd.
Peter-Emil Mitev President, Bulgarian Sociological Association
Rumen Georgiev Deputy Director, National Investigation Office
Rumyana Bachvarova Director, Market Test Ltd.
Svetoslav Slavov General Manager, GfK Bulgaria
Valeri Roussanov President, Access Association
Yancislav Yanakiev Head of Department, Center for Sociological
Studies, Ministry of Defense
Zhivko Georgiev Director of Research, BBSS Gallup International
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During the implementation of the Coalition 2000 initiatives, new members of
the Expert Council could be invited in order to further discuss and develop
CMS methodology and outputs.
Public Access to CMS Data
The empirical information collected through the CMS surveys will be made
available (on demand) to research agencies and government bodies in
Bulgaria, as well as to international organizations for further analysis and re-
porting. Through the Expert Council an effort will be made to coordinate
corruption assessment research in order to develop a methodology which
ensures maximum reliability of data and objectivity of analyses.
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III. STRUCTURE OF THE
CORRUPTION MONITORING
SYSTEM
The CMS includes several basic types of surveys (coded from S1 to S7 in the
table below) which are to be conducted with different periodicity.
Survey ID Survey Type Time-frame
S1 Quantitative national representative Quarterly
survey of the population
S2 Quantitative survey of public officials Quarterly
S3 Focus group discussions with experts Quarterly
S4 Focus group discussions with public Yearly
officials
S5 In-depth interviews with policy makers Yearly
S6 Media monitoring Monthly
S7 Testing awareness campaign When necessary
messages of the Coalition 2000 with
the Perception Analyzer System
The surveys conducted quarterly are included in the Corruption Monitoring
Panel. Corruption Indices are computed from the quantitative surveys in-
cluded in the CMS (S1, S2, and S6). They make it possible to estimate the
dynamics of public attitudes and actions, characterizing different aspects of
corruption-related phenomena. Regular observations also provide feedback
on the effectiveness of the anti-corruption initiatives in Bulgarian society and
on the progress toward achieving the goals of Coalition 2000. Qualitative
studies included in the Corruption Monitoring Panel (S3, S4, S5) will be used
to improve and refine CMS design and methodology.
Once a year the Corruption Monitoring Panel will be expanded with the
surveys S4 and S5. On the basis of the extended Corruption Monitoring
Panel, a Corruption Assessment Report will be prepared for the annual
Policy Forum. The report will summarize the results of all surveys conduct-
ed in the preceding 12 months and will derive conclusions about the scope
and dimensions of corruption in the country. The Corruption Assessment
Report will also evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives. The
first Corruption Assessment Report for 1998 will be prepared and dissemi-
nated in December 1998.
1. Structure of
the CMS
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Development and implementation of the CMS is to be accomplished during
the following stages:
Stage 1: Elaboration and testing of the first version of the CMS
methodology
Duration
6 months (April 1998 Ñ September 1998)
Main purposes:
¥ development of the design and methodology of CMS surveys;
¥ submission of initial data to the experts of Coalition 2000, working on the
anti-corruption Action Plan.
Information sources:
Development of the CMS is based on the experience and information
gained from the following surveys, conducted by Vitosha Research with the
Center for the Study of Democracy:
¥ qualitative study (focus group discussions) on the problems of interactions
between citizens and public sector officials. It was conducted in October
1996 in the framework of a joint international project with Glasgow
University, Scotland;
¥ four national representative surveys of the Bulgarian population on the prob-
lems of public tolerance towards different forms of corrupt behavior. The
surveys were based on national representative random samples and have
been conducted in March 1997, September 1997, January 1998, and May
1998;
¥ Representative quantitative survey of the population (national sample) on the
problems of the interaction between citizens and public sector officials. The
survey was conducted in January 1998 in the framework of a joint interna-
tional project with Glasgow University, Scotland.
Surveys S3, S4, and S5 are used to elaborate the methodology of S1, S2 and
S7. At the same time, the methodology of the initial qualitative studies is
based on the experience and results of the quantitative surveys listed above.
Activities:
Creating the initial CMS information database including the surveys S1, S2,
S3, S4, S5 and S6.
Stage 2: Improvement of the CMS methodology
Duration:
3 months (September 1998 Ñ December 1998)
Main purposes:
¥ Establishing an Expert Council and reviewing the CMS methodology;
¥ Improvement of the CMS methodology which is to be implemented at
the next stage;
2. Stages of
Implementation
of the CMS
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¥ Preparation and review of the first versions of the CMS reports:
Ð Corruption Indices of Coalition 2000;
Ð 1998 Corruption Assessment Report.
Information sources:
The initial CMS information database including the surveys S1, S2, S3, S4, S5
and S6.
Activities:
1. Elaboration of:
Ð Corruption Indices of Coalition 2000;
Ð Corruption Assessment Report.
2. Review of the reports in the Expert Council and publication
3. Development of the second modified version of the design and the
methodology of the CMS
Stage 3: Current Corruption Monitoring
Duration:
January 1999 Ñ December 2001
Main purposes:
¥ Implementation of the regular surveys included in the CMS;
¥ Preparation and publication of the reports:
Ð Corruption Indices of Coalition 2000;
Ð Corruption Assessment Report.
Information sources:
CMS surveys
Activities:
¥ Regular implementation of the surveys included in the CMS;
¥ Preparation and publication of the reports:
Ð Corruption Indices of Coalition 2000;
Ð Corruption Assessment Report.
IV. CMS SURVEY METHODOLOGY
The sample size of the national representative surveys is about 1200Ð1500.
The sample is representative of the Bulgarian population aged 15 and over.
Surveys will be based on a two-stage cluster sample constructed from the list
of the electoral sections of the last parliamentary or local elections. In the
first stage, primary units (clusters) are chosen with probability proportional
to the size of units according to the number of the electoral sections in the
country. In the second stage, the respondents within the clusters are chosen
at random. Each interviewer will be supplied with the names and the ad-
dresses of the respondents to be interviewed.
The survey method will be face-to-face interview.
Information will be collected about public opinion on the following main is-
sues:
¥ public attitudes towards corruption Ñ scope, levels, types, public toler-
ance, identification of the corruption, etc.;
¥ personal experience of the respondents with different types of corrupt
practices;
¥ assessment of the economic situation in Bulgaria as a factor of corruption;
¥ political corruption and trust in the public institutions;
¥ anti-corruption strategies and activities, etc.
Quantitative survey of public officials is conducted with a sample of 300 of-
ficials. The survey method is face-to-face interview.
There are two important advantages of this method:
¥ compared to the national representative surveys of the population the
sample is smaller. In this sense, this type of survey is more flexible;
¥ a specific social group could be addressed, whose opinions and evalua-
tions very often determine the decisions taken by the major actors in the po-
litical and economic scene.
Public officials from the following spheres will be interviewed:
1. Public officials in the central administration;
2. Public officials at the local level of municipal authorities;
3. Public officials at the Employment Offices, Social Care Centers,
National Insurance Institute, etc.;
4. Police;
2. Quantitative
Survey of Public
Officials (S2)
1. National
Representative
Surveys of the
Population (S1)
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5. Court officials (judges, prosecutors, investigators);
6. Customs officials;
7. Tax officials;
8. Financial inspectors;
9. Public health (physicians, dentists, nurses, hospital administrators);
10. Education (university professors, university administrators, school-
teachers);
11. PTT and telecommunication officials and others.
Quota sampling of the public officials will be used, based on the following
criteria:
1. Type of employment;
2. Region;
3. Type of settlement;
4. Age;
5. Gender.
Three types of discussions are to be held: with public sector officials, with
businessmen and managers, and with experts. Representatives of different
groups of public officials will be recruited to participate in the focus
groups Ñ central and local administration, health system, education, police,
judicial system, social care, tax administration and customs, etc.
The recruitment procedure to be used includes the following steps:
¥ to select the participants from various groups of public officials and ex-
perts, and to receive their consent to participate in one of the focus groups;
¥ to compose the groups with a ratio between potential and actual partici-
pants of at least 2:1, i.e. 13Ð15 respondents for each group;
¥ to receive final agreement of the selected potential participants 2Ð3 days
before carrying out the discussions. Expected refusal rate is about 20Ð25%;
¥ to select the final participants (8Ð10 persons) on the day of the discus-
sions.
Using the focus groups will help to achieve a better understanding of cor-
ruption-related attitudes, expectations, motives and behavior of the public
officials. Qualitative study allows to better formulate the questions of the
quantitative survey and to delineate new problematic areas to be addressed
in the framework of Coalition 2000 activities.
3. Focus group
discussions
(S3, S4)
In-depth interviews are included in the diagnostic component of the project
and are conducted once per year. A quota sample of 20 policy makers will
be used. Representatives of governmental and municipal administration,
parliamentarians, ministers, directors of state and private enterprises, may-
ors and councilors will be interviewed as follows:
¥ 10 in-depth interviews with politicians and public officials in central and
local level administration;
¥ 10 in-depth interviews with businessmen and managers.
The main advantages of this kind of interview are the elimination of group
influences and deeper elaboration of the topics, revealing the details and
nuances of the issues under consideration which could not be detected by
quantitative methods.
As an element of the CMS, media monitoring is designed to achieve several
objectives:
¥ to measure the level of exposure of corruption-related problems in elec-
tronic and print media. Assessments about the influence of the media on the
attitudes and opinions of different social groups will be made through the
use of specific research techniques;
¥ to produce feedback about the media coverage of the initiatives of
Coalition 2000 and other similar citizensÕ activities aimed at curbing corrup-
tion.
Media monitoring objectives will be achieved through synchronized activi-
ties in three directions:
1. Regular monitoring of the news programs of National TV and
National Radio.
The purpose of the monitoring is to locate the coverage of corruption-rela-
ted issues in the news programs. Monitoring is conducted using a specially
designed questionnaire, and data will be summarized and presented as a
part of the report ÒCorruption Indices of Coalition 2000.Ó
2. Regular monitoring of central newspapers with national coverage.
The objective of the monitoring is to gauge the presence of corruption-re-
lated problems in the whole aggregate of the observed print media.
Monitoring is conducted using a specially designed questionnaire, and data
will be summarized and presented as a part of the report ÒCorruption
Indices of Coalition 2000.Ó
3. Collating the results of media monitoring and quantitative surveys
(S1 and S2).
This element of media monitoring is based on Agenda Setting methodology.
This is a research method which uses statistical tools to identify relationships
between the media coverage of a certain topic and the public attitudes and
5. Media moni-
toring (S6)
4. In-depth inter-
views with
Policy Makers
(S5)
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opinions registered at the same time period. The Agenda Setting approach
allows conclusions to be drawn about the correlation between public atti-
tudes, media influences, and the broader social context.
This type of analysis will provide substantial feedback concerning the im-
plementation of the initiatives of Coalition 2000 as well as an accurate defin-
ition of the objectives and activities included in the Public Awareness
Campaign.
V. COALITION 2000 CORRUPTION
INDICES: METHODOLOGY AND
THEORETICAL APPROACH
The corruption indices of Coalition 2000 are a system of synthetic indicators,
which present the results of the quantitative surveys of the CMS (S1 and S2)
and the media monitoring (S6) in a summarized form. Implicitly the corrup-
tion indices also summarize the results of the qualitative surveys (S3, S4 and
S5), as the latter are used for the elaboration and the improvement of the
methodology of the quantitative surveys.
The main objective in constructing the corruption indices is to reduce the
multidimensionality of corruption as a social phenomenon to a reduced set
of synthetic indicators. The advantages of such an approach are at least the
following:
¥ synthetic indicators (corruption indices) facilitate the public presentation
of the results, thus making analysis easier to perceive;
¥ the employment of synthetic indicators is a prerequisite for establishing
time series and respectively for analyzing and assessing change.
The four types of corruption indices are based on a relatively simple theo-
retical reconstruction of the elements of the social action:
¥ social action has its specific prerequisites, among which the more impor-
tant are social actorsÕ attitudes, interiorized values and the way actors per-
ceive their social environment;
¥ social action itself presupposes a specific interrelationship of actors in
which they exchange the resources they possess in order to achieve a spe-
cific objective;
¥ action results include certain specific characteristics: 1) they change or
preserve the initial (pre-action) prerequisites; and 2) they leave a specific
ÒtraceÓ in the social environment (change or preserve its structural compo-
nents);
¥ the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the objectives generates expectations
among actors about the character and the structure of social action in its
subsequent cycle. Based on these expectations, each actor constructs or
changes his behavioral strategy.
Applied to corruption, this model of social action could be reduced to the
following basic components:
2. Theoretical
base of the
study of the
elements
of corrupt
behavior
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Action Components Components of Corruption Behavior
Action Prerequisites Attitudes towards corruption
Include the identification of corruption as a social
phenomenon, the assessment of its normative
(value) permissibility and the degree of willing-
ness to override the norms of legitimate social be-
havior
Actor Interaction Corrupt practices
Include the activity of the actors, connected with
creating a situation for corrupt practices (the exer-
cising of pressure) and the actual act of corrupt
behavior.
Action Results Assessments of the magnitude of corruption
Include the assessment of the level of prolifera-
tion (involvement) of public officials in different
forms of corrupt behavior as well as the assess-
ment of the levels of transformation of corruption
into a behavioral norm (into a socially effective
instrument for solving personal problems).
Expectations Assessment of the perspectives on corruption
Include assessments of the capabilities of society
(its potential) to combat corruption.
It should be especially noted that the application of the general model of so-
cial action (even in its simplified form) to corruption (in constructing the
methodology of the quantitative studies) is, for understandable reasons, sub-
ject to a multitude of restrictions. In this respect the model on which the
study of corrupt behavior is based is much simpler than it could have been.
In constructing the set of indicators that was actually employed, the objec-
tive was to use the indispensable minimum in a way that would make it pos-
sible to maintain professional standards of fieldwork.
Corruption is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon and is associ-
ated with several differing definitions. The operational definition adopted
defines corruption as abuse of power (economic, political, and administra-
tive) in the interest of personal or group gain and at the expense of the in-
dividual, specific groups or society as a whole. This rather broad definition
is warranted by the character of the phenomenon itself as well as by the
wide-scope initiatives against corruption on the national and international
level, including both citizens and governments.
The reproduction of corruption presupposes the existence of four necessary
components: 1) state/public officials; 2) discretionary power; 3) abuse of
public power; 4) private gain on behalf of officials. Depending on the forms
3. Theoretical
Interpretation
of Corruption
Indices.
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in which these components actually function, there could exist different
forms, levels, spheres and mechanisms of corruption.
Corruption manifests itself mainly in the interactions between the public
sector on one side, and citizens and private business on the other. There are
two basic types of corruption: Grand corruption, which involves top state
officials, politicians and business people and refers to the allocation of sub-
stantial resources; and Petit corruption, which usually includes lower-level
public officials and refers to the daily interactions between them and citi-
zens and businesses (small and medium size). This second type is more
widespread and is associated with smaller payments and/or a system of fa-
vors and gifts.
Having in mind the specific objectives of corrupt behavior, two specific cas-
es of corruption should be considered. First, abuse of power for private gain
in cases where officials are obliged to provide a certain service by law. This
type of corruption, known as Ògreasing the wheels,Ó is targeted at the faster
or more expedient delivery of services, or greater safety in the resolution of
the problem. A second case is when an official provides services/rights to
which the citizen (business) is not entitled by law, or even services that are
a direct abuse of the law.
From an economic point of view the proliferation of corruption follows the
classic market principles of supply and demand: a larger demand and a larg-
er discretionary power of officials produces an environment that facilitates
and encourages corruption. The value of the bribe depends on the expect-
ed profit or benefit. In this respect corrupt behavior could be regarded as
mutually beneficial economic transactions. However, these transactions
eliminate the rules of competition and the legal regulations and thus distort
market principles and criteria for efficient economic action and decision
making.
The definition of corruption as a negative social phenomenon allows several
assumptions to be made concerning the interpretation of the indicator in-
cluded in the CMS:
¥ in an ideal state of society (the practical absence of corruption), corrup-
tion attitudes should assume minimal values; i.e., citizens should perceive
corrupt behavior as morally inadmissible and they should not be inclined to
compromise their moral values. Intensity of corrupt behavior should also be
minimal, and corrupt behavior should be rated low as an effective problem-
solving practice.
¥ it would be logical to assume that the existence of a certain level of toler-
ance of corrupt behavior (moral admissibility) would have several conse-
quences. First, readiness to compromise would increase as the level of tol-
erance increases. Second, the frequency of practical acts of corruption
would also increase with the level of tolerance (due to the Ònatural intensi-
tyÓ of social conformity). Third, in cases when the frequency of corrupt be-
havior surpasses the level of Òsingle isolated casesÓ it is likely that assess-
ments of the pervasiveness of corruption would substantially surpass the fre-
Methodology and Design 87
quency of practical acts of corrupt behavior (only one case of Òtaking a
bribeÓ would be sufficient to socially label an official as ÒcorruptÓ). Fourth,
the existence of a social environment where acts of corrupt behavior exceed
the level of Òsingle isolated casesÓ is very likely to produce the perception
that corruption is a socially normal environmental component. The chances
of that perception being firm and widespread increase with the limited im-
plementation of sanction mechanisms.
One of the basic theoretical assumptions for the construction of the CMS is
that it is more important to track the dynamics of corruption in several di-
mensions than to analyze its initial/current values. Because corruption has
been identified as a problem to Bulgarian society, it would be important to
assess its gravity. However, it is more important to know dynamics: whether
corruption is evolving in the positive or in the negative direction in compar-
ison with its initial baseline values.
Corruption indices provide an approximation about the scope and aspects
of corruption based on the assessments of citizens and public officials. These
assessments are the starting point for their practical behavior and the way
they perceive their social environment. Corruption indices could not be a
base for making direct conclusions about the exact level of proliferation of
corrupt practices.
Because the index of personal involvement in corrupt practices is based on
the anonymous admissions of respondents, it comes closest to indicating the
Òlevel of proliferation of corruption.Ó Also, to a certain extent the specific le-
gal characteristics of corruption (that both sides act illegally) make this index
one of the few realistic measures of the actual level of proliferation of cor-
ruption.
Currently, in comparison with the information available from law enforce-
ment institutions, the accuracy level of empirical survey estimates of the re-
alities of corruption is (for obvious reasons) substantially higher.
The CMS includes four types of indices:
Attitudes towards Corruption
1. Principle Acceptability of Corruption
The index reflects the degree to which Bulgarians accept, at the level of val-
ues, certain acts of corrupt behavior on behalf of members of Parliament
and public officials. Using a 3-point scale the admissibility of 12 types of
practices with different degrees of ÒcorruptnessÓ are assessed.
2. Susceptibility to Corruption (general public)
This index measures the inclination to compromise on values, principles and
legality in order to perform corrupt acts, such as giving or accepting money
and/or gifts for the purpose of solving certain personal problems. The index
is based on two independent questions describing situations in which there
are two possible types of behavior: giving/taking money or gifts, and refusal.
4. Structure and
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3. Susceptibility to Corruption (public officials)
This index reflects the existing attitudes among public officials to accept
money or gifts (to participate in corrupt practices) under certain conditions:
providing additional services and performing duties faster than normal.
Assessments are rated on a 3-point scale.
Corrupt practices
1. Corruption Pressure on the General Public
This index shows the degree to which the citizens are subject to direct or in-
direct pressure to participate in corrupt practices with public officials. It ac-
counts for cases in which public officials wanted or showed they were ex-
pecting corrupt behavior from the citizens and/or their families.
2. Corruption Pressure on Public Officials
This index reflects the frequency of attempts to corrupt public officials with
the purpose of solving personal problems. The frequency is assessed on a 4-
point scale.
3. Personal Involvement in Acts of Corrupt Behavior (general public)
This index reflects self-confessions about cases in which citizens have of-
fered public officials money or gifts. The frequency of these cases is regis-
tered on a 4-point scale.
4. Personal Involvement in Acts of Corrupt Behavior (public officials)
This index reflects the degree to which public sector officials accepted mon-
ey or gifts when dealing with citizensÕ personal problems as part of their pro-
fessional obligations.
Magnitude of Corruption
1. Spread of Corruption (according to citizens)
This index reflects citizensÕ assessment of the spread of corruption in the
country. It can also be computed for specific groups of public officials. The
spread of corruption is measured by two indicators using 4-point scales.
2. Spread of Corruption (according to public officials)
This index reflects the extent to which citizens attempt to resolve their per-
sonal problems by offering money or presents to public officials. The fre-
quency of these cases is estimated using a 4-point scale.
3. Practical Effectiveness of Corrupt Behavior
This index shows the extent to which citizens perceive corruption as an ef-
ficient tool for solving personal problems. It is based on the registered prob-
ability of citizens offering money and/or gifts in order to successfully resolve
their problems.
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Expectations about the Future of Corruption
This index reflects the expectations of the general public about the capacity
of society to curb corruption in the country. Expectations are rated on a 4-
point scale.
Two types of indicators have been used in constructing the corruption in-
dices:
(a) Indicators measured on three- or four-point scales
(b) Indicators measured on dihotonomous scales
The method used to construct indices using indicators of the first type in-
cludes the following steps:
1. A rank (ranging between 0Ð2 or 0Ð3) is assigned to each value of indica-
tor.
2. Each rank is weighted by the percentage of respondents who have cho-
sen the respective answer option (excluding the ÒdonÕt knowÓ and Òno an-
swerÓ categories).
3. The value of the indicator is computed as a sum of the weighted ranks.
Example: The index for the spread of corruption is constructed based on the
following question:
According to you how widespread is corruption in this country?
One answer only.
Rank Valid percent
1 Almost all state officials are involved in it 3 19
2 Most state officials are involved in it 2 42
3 Only a few state officials are involved in it 1 38
4 Hardly any state officials are involved in it 0 1
9 DK/NA Ñ Ñ
I = 3õ0.19 + 2õ0.42 + 1õ0.38 + 0õ0.01 = 1.79
The value of the index ranges between 0 and 3. The closer this value is to 3,
the more widespread is corruption (according to respondent assessments).
With the second type of indicators indices could assume values between 0
and 1. Their specific values are computed in the following way:
1. The two answer options are assigned the ranks of 0 and 1.
2. The value of the index is equal to the percentage of respondents who
have chosen the answer option ranked 1.
Example: The index of susceptibility to corruption is constructed based on
the following question:
5. Method of
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Imagine that you are a state official on a low salary and a citizen who comes to
you with a problem offers you money or a gift. Would you:
One answer only.
Rank Valid percent
1 Be tempted to accept and provide 1 40
a better service
2 Be offended by the proposal 0 60
8 Neither/ It depends Ñ Ñ
9 DK/NA Ñ Ñ
I = 1õ0.4 = 0.4
The closer the value of the index is to 1, the higher the susceptibility to cor-
ruption.
In order to construct aggregate indices, the values of the individual indices
are normalized by adjusting their values to fall into the range 0.00 Ñ 1.00.
Normalized values are then summed. For example, the index for the spread
of corruption is normalized by dividing its current value (1.79) by its maxi-
mum value (3.00), obtaining its normalized value (0.60). The values of all ag-
gregate indices thus range between 0.00 and 1.00. This value is then recal-
culated to fit into a scale ranging between 0 and 10 (or between 0 and 100).
The aggregate corruption indices have been constructed based on the in-
formation collected in two of the surveys of Vitosha Research: (S1) Ñ the
quantitative national representative survey of the population aged 15 and
over as of June 1998, and (S2) Ñ the quantitative survey of public officials
of July 1998.
The aggregate indices presented have been computed for the population as
a whole, but could also be computed for specific population categories. The
baseline information and values for the indices are presented in the publi-
cation Coalition 2000 Corruption Indices. Baseline values of indices, howev-
er, do not reveal the full explanatory potential of corruption indices. Their
full potential will be utilized in the next series of surveys when analysis of the
dynamics and comparisons will be made possible. In their first issue, cor-
ruption indices have only one value and provide the baseline characteristics
of public consciousness and corruption behavior in the beginning of the
monitoring period (June-July 1998).
6. Information
base for com-
puting the
1998 corrup-
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1.1. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 50/225, Public adminis-
tration and development, 50th session, 112th plenary meeting, 19 April
1996
1.2. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/51/59 of 12
December 1996 ÒAction against corruptionÓ and Annex ÒInternational Code
of Conduct for Public OfficialsÓ
1.3. United Nations, International Code of Conduct for Public Officials (12
Dec. 1996) A/RES/51/59
1.4. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/51/191 of 16
December 1996 ÒUnited Nations Declaration against Corruption and
Bribery in International Commercial TransactionsÓ and Annex ÒUnited
Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International
Commercial TransactionsÓ
1.5. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/52/87
ÒInternational Cooperation Against Corruption and Bribery in International
Commercial TransactionsÓ
1.6. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution E/RES/95/14 ÒAction
against corruptionÓ
1.7. General Assembly Resolution E/RES/96/8 ÒAction Against CorruptionÓ
1.8. Declaration of the 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Lima,
September 7Ð9, 1997
2.1. United Nations, Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, Adopted by the Conference at its 6th plenary
meeting, 19 December 1988
2.2. OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions DAFFE/IME/BR(97)17/FINAL
(Entry into force by 31 December 1998.)
2.3. Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS No. 141) 
2.4. Council of Europe, Agreement on illicit traffic by sea, implementing
Article 17 of the United Nations Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances (ETS No. 156) 
2.5. Council of Europe, Draft Framework Convention against Corruption,
CM (98)57
2.6. European Union, Convention on the protection of the European
CommunitiesÕ financial interests, (26 July 1995), OJ C 316/48, 27.12.1995 
2.7. Protocol of the Convention on the protection of the European
CommunitiesÕ financial interests, which deals specifically with corruption,
(26 September 1996), OJ C 313/01, 23.10.1996
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2.8. EU, Convention of 26 May 1997 on the fight against corruption involv-
ing officials of the European Communities or officials of the Member States
of the European Union, OJ C 195/1, 25.06.1997
Council Act of 26 May 1997 drawing up, on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of
the Treaty on European Union, the Convention on the fight against corrup-
tion involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member
States of the European Union
2.9. OAS, Inter-American Convention against Corruption, Caracas,
Venezuela; 29 March 1996
2.10. UN, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods,
Construction and Services
2.11. UN, Model Law on Money Laundering, Confiscation and International
Cooperation in Relation to Drugs Legal Advisory Programme, November
1995
3.1. United Nations Development Programme, Programme for
Accountability and Transparency (1996)
3.2. European Union, Action Plan Against Organized Crime, European
Council at Amsterdam, June 16Ð17 1997
3.3. European Union, Communication of the Commission on Combating
Corruption of May 21, 1997
3.4. Common positions of 6 October and 13 November 1997, both on the
negotiations in the Council of Europe and the OECD on the fight against cor-
ruption, OJ C 279/01, 13.10.1997 and OJ C 320/01, 21.11.1997
3.5. Council of Europe, Programme of Action against Corruption, 1996 Ñ
2000
3.6. WTO, Agreement on Government Procurement
3.7. Recommendation of the Council of OECD of 11 April 1996
3.8. Revised Recommendation of the Council of OECD of 23 May 1997
4.1. UN, Fifth Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the treatment of
Offenders, Changes in Forms and Dimensions of Criminality Ñ
Transnational and National, Working paper prepared by the Secretariat,
A/CONF.56/3
4.2. UN, Fifth Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, The Emerging Roles of the Police and Other Law Enforcement
Agencies, with Special reference to Changing Expectations and Minimum
Standards of Performance, Working paper prepared by the Secretariat,
A/CONF.56/5
4.3. UN, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (Seventh
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
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Offenders, Milan, 26 August Ñ 6 September 1985: report prepared by the
Secretariat (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IV.1), chap. I, sect.
D.2, annex)
4.4. UN, Ninth Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the treatment of
Offenders, background paper prepared by the Secretariat on international
action against corruption, Cairo, 29 AprilÐ8 May 1995, A/CONF. 169/14
4.5. UN, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Third ses-
sion,Vienna, 26 April Ñ 6 May 1994, CONF.169/PM.1/Add.1 19 January
1994
4.6. UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Report on
the Seventh Session (21Ð30 April 1998), doc. E/CN.15/1998/11
4.7. UN, Department of Technical Cooperation for Development and
Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, Corruption in
Government: Report of an Interregional Seminar, The Hague, Netherlands,
11Ð15 December 1989 (New York, 1990) (TCD/SEM.90/2 Ñ INTÐ89-R56)
5.1. UN, Efforts by the United Nations to address the issue of corrupt prac-
tices Ñ E/1991/31/Add.1
5.2. UN, ÒPractical measures against corruptionÓ, International Review of
Criminal Policy, Nos. 41 and 42 (United Nations publication, Sales No.
E.93.IV.4)
5.3. UN, ÒPromotion and maintenance of the rule of law: action against cor-
ruption and briberyÓ, Report of the Secretary-General, doc. E/CN.15/1998/3
5.4. UN, Support by the UN System of the Efforts of Governments to
Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies. Report of the
Secretary-General
5.5. UN, Report of the African Regional Ministerial Workshop on Organized
Transnational Crime and Corruption, held at Dakar from 21 to 23 July 1997,
doc. E/CN.15/1998/6/Add.1
5.6. Report of the Asia Regional Ministerial Meeting on Organized
Transnational Crime, held in Manila from 23 to 25 March 1998, doc.
E/CN.15/1998/6/Add.2
5.7. OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Final Report of the Ad
Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance,
Paris 1997
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1997
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6.1. Cooperation agreement between the Minister of Interior of the
Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Turkey against drug trafficking, terrorism and organized crime Ñ Sofia,
February 3, 1993
6.2. Cooperation agreement between the Minister of the Interior of the
Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry of the Interior of FYROM Ñ Skopje,
October 20, 1992
6.3. Agreement between the Minister of Interior of the Republic of Bulgaria
and the Ministry of Public Order of the Republic of Greece on the cooper-
ation in the struggle against international terrorism, drug trafficking and or-
ganized crime Ñ Athens, July 1991
6.4. Treaty between the governments of the Republic of Bulgaria and the
Republic of Croatia on cooperation in the struggle with / combating of or-
ganized crime, illegal traffic of narcotic and psychotropic substances and ter-
rorism Ñ Sofia, November 26, 1996 (not ratified)
6.5. Treaty on the cooperation against terrorism, organized crime, illicit traf-
fic of narcotic and psychotropic substances, money laundering, traffic in
arms and people and other major crimes Ñ Antalia, Turkey, April 16, 1998. 
The treaty was signed by Bulgaria, Turkey and Romania with an accession (inclu-
sion) clause
6.6. Sofia Declaration on good neighborly relations / friendly relations, sta-
bility, security and cooperation on the Balkans Ñ Sofia, July 7, 1996
6.7. Common statement of the heads of state and prime ministers of the
countries of South Ñ Eastern Europe Ñ Crete, November 4, 1997
6.8. Common statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria,
Greece and Romania Ñ Santorini, April 11, 1998
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POSSIBILITIES FOR THE CREATION
OF THE OMBUDSMAN INSTITUTION
IN THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP 
OF THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY
OF DEMOCRACY

A. JUSTIFICATION
During the past years, Bulgaria has been taking significant steps for the es-
tablishment of democratic institutions founded on the rule-of-law principle
and an autonomous and active civil society. This process, however, does not
guarantee automatically and effectively enough the protection of human
rights, therefore the search for and the introduction of new legal, institu-
tional and regulatory mechanisms is inevitably required. The problem is re-
lated not only to securing a private sphere, free from state interference, but
much more to providing means for counteracting any interference of the
state which infringes on the autonomy of the individual or civil society, and
for reinstating the infringed basic rights and liberties. The existing guarantees
and protection mechanisms of the newly-formed Bulgarian democracy can-
not, in themselves, successfully solve these problems.
The democratic European countries pay increasing attention to the out-of-
court methods for protection of human rights which add to or go along with
the more expensive and cumbersome judicial, administrative and other
forms of protection. Among them, with a longer or shorter tradition in the
different countries, the institution of ombudsman stands out.
The primary function and role of the ombudsman and the other similar in-
stitutions is to observe the function of administration in the country and to
prevent abuse of power, corruption and arbitrary decisions which infringe
on human rights, to assist with the reinstatement of the individualsÕ rights
abused by the state or by the state servants and to contribute to the creation
of a climate of respect for human rights and the autonomy of the society. In
many countries the ombudsman institution has developed as an element of
the mechanism for guaranteeing the free exercise of human rights.
A brief review and comparison of the experience of the European countries
in this area can be useful for formulating the respective conclusions, recom-
mendations and views for the creation, status and role of a similar institution
in Bulgaria.
An ombudsman or a similar institution has been established and is func-
tioning in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Germany, Ireland,
Iceland, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, and in many Central and East European countries Ñ Poland,
Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia
and former Soviet Republics such as Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and
Uzbekistan.
Generally, the ombudsmanÕs functions are performed by one or more indi-
viduals with general or specific competencies on a national and/or regional
and local level. For the first time the institution was set up in the
Scandinavian countries (the institution was first established in Sweden in
1713 by the King) from where its name comes. In its classical form the insti-
tution is either set up directly by the constitution or elsewhere, and is em-
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powered by the Parliament to safeguard the rights of private persons against
the infringement of the state administration.
Presently, the institution in Sweden is based on the constitution. It consists
of four ombudsmen appointed by the Swedish Parliament for a four-year
term, which may be extended for another term. There are no specific re-
quirements respecting their educational or professional background or
(since 1941) their sex. The Swedish ombudsman can receive and review pe-
titions filed by anyone, including foreign citizens. There is no requirement
that the available judicial and administrative mechanisms for protection
must be exhausted before filing. If more than two years have passed be-
tween the occurrence of the grievance and the submission of the petition,
the ombudsman may investigate the case only if a public interest is affected.
If the respective case is pending before the court, the ombudsman must
postpone its investigation until the pronouncement of the respective judg-
ment. The scope of activity of the Swedish ombudsmen extends to the
whole civil and military administration, the judicial system, state-owned en-
terprises, and private entities vested with state powers. Their scope of activ-
ity excludes the government, the ministers and members of legislative bod-
ies and, to some extent, the Swedish National Bank. In their activities the
ombudsmen are independent and have access to all sorts of information,
documents, and those institutions controlled by them, during the normal
working hours. They can make recommendations to the state authorities but
cannot directly influence the decisions of the court or the administration.
There is a report filed for every investigation, and a comprehensive annual
report is submitted to the Parliament.
The institutions which were created and are active in Norway, Denmark,
Finland, The Netherlands, and more recently in Spain and Portugal, are sim-
ilar to the Swedish model, but with various deviations and accents. For ex-
ample, the ombudsman in Norway is also appointed by the Parliament, fol-
lowing each parliamentary election, for a period of four years, but has to
meet certain requirements: at least 30 years of age, and holding a universi-
ty degree in law. His term of office can be withdrawn at any time by the
Parliament with a two-thirds qualified majority vote. The scope of the om-
budsmanÕs legal authority excludes all matters which are within the compe-
tence of the Parliament, the decisions of the government, the judiciary, the
Chamber of Audit and the defense authorities. He has limited powers in re-
spect to local administration. In principle, a petition can be filed with the
ombudsman only after all other available protection mechanisms have been
exhausted. The petition may be submitted within a one-year period. After
the expiration of that year, however, the ombudsman may initiate an inves-
tigation himself.
The institution in Finland, according to the Constitution of 1919, consists of
a parliamentary ombudsman Ñ Òan individual well-known for his distin-
guished knowledge of law,Ó a deputy ombudsman and an ombudsmanÕs as-
sistant, all appointed by a unanimous vote of the Parliament for a term of
four years. The ombudsman is not authorized to control the performance of
the obligations of the President and the MPs. The petitions submitted to the
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ombudsman are in a free-style form and free of charge. Investigations can
be either carried out on the basis of a petition or initiated by the ombuds-
man. The annual report to the Parliament summarizes the performed activ-
ities and analyzes the condition of the judicial system and any detected
drawbacks or irregularities of legislation.
The national ombudsman in the Netherlands is appointed by the Lower
Chamber of Parliament upon a proposal from the Vice President of the State
Council, the Chairperson of the Supreme Court and the President of the
Common Chamber of Audit. His term of office is six years. The Ombudsman
is banned from being a member of Parliament or local councils or perma-
nent consultatory governmental commissions (such as the State Council),
and he is also banned from performing any public functions or acting as a
private attorney or notary officer. The annual report is presented to both
chambers of Parliament and to the ministers.
The ombudsman in Austria Ñ public advocate Ñ is an independent
supreme federal body consisting of three ombudsmen who are elected by
the Parliament for a six-year term, which may not be extended. The
Ombudsman is banned from participating in the federal or provincial gov-
ernment, serving as a member of representative bodies, or having any oth-
er profession. The relationship between the ombudsman and the supervised
institutions is regulated in detail. If recommendations are given, the ad-
dressed administrative body is required either to comply with them within
an eight-week period or to explain in writing the reasons for not doing so.
The ombudsman is also empowered to file a claim with the Constitutional
Court challenging the constitutionality of a statutory provision.
The younger South European democracies (Spain and Portugal), following in
general terms the Scandinavian model, introduced the institution of om-
budsman into their constitutions as well. In the Kingdom of Spain the pub-
lic advocate, in his capacity of a supreme commissioner of the Parliament,
is appointed by the latter to protect basic rights and freedoms. He controls
the activities of the administration and reports directly to the Parliament. In
extraordinary circumstances (for example, criminal sentence) the two cham-
bers of the Parliament can decide on his dismissal. His supervisory powers
are extended to the entire state administration, including the state-owned
enterprises. The addressed administrative authorities are required to submit
their statements regarding an unofficial procedure of preliminary examina-
tion within 15 days. Most of the cases are solved through mediation be-
tween the affected party and the administrative body. In addition to his con-
ventional powers, the Spanish public advocate is empowered to challenge
the constitutionality of statutory provisions before the Constitutional Court
and to file with the Constitutional Court petitions for abuse of basic rights,
including against court judgments.
The institutions in Great Britain and France deviate considerably from the
practices of the other West European democracies and their more newly-es-
tablished South European counterparts, in terms of appointment, status, and
powers of the institution.
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The parliamentary administration commissioner in Great Britain is appoint-
ed by the Queen upon a proposal from the Parliament. His term of office
expires at the end of the calendar year during which he became 65 years of
age, or when the Queen approves his resignation. He is not empowered to
control the activities of the entire state administration. The public adminis-
tration of Northern Ireland is not within his scope of authority; neither are
the acts of Parliament, the government, nor the judiciary. Petitions are sub-
mitted to the parliamentary commissioner through the MPs. His investiga-
tions are not publicized, but he annually reports his activities and any de-
tected irregularities to the two chambers of the Parliament. If a public au-
thority fails to undertake any measures for the elimination of the adminis-
trative irregularities detected by the parliamentary commissioner, the
Parliament is empowered to undertake the appropriate measures.
The mediator in France can be regarded as a specific form of the ombuds-
man institution. He is primarily an intermediary between the citizens and
the administration. He is appointed by the Council of Ministers (in fact, by
the President) for a six-year term which may not be extended. The elected
Ombudsman cannot be an MP, but he can be a member of a department
or municipality council (if at the time of his appointment as a mediator he
had already been occupying this position) and can exercise his profession.
Once appointed, the mediator is independent and cannot be dismissed by
the government. The mediator is authorized to judge the work of the gov-
ernmental agencies, local authorities, state institutions and other public
bodies which have administrative powers, in respect to their interaction
with the public. The mediator may only take action if a petition is filed with
his office against the improper functioning of an administrative body or an
unfair administrative act. He can make recommendations and give manda-
tory terms for taking action. If he does not receive a satisfactory response or
an appropriate reaction, he can publicly announce his recommendations
and proposals, initiate disciplinary proceedings against all responsible offi-
cials, and even approach the criminal court.
In the Federal Republic of Germany the institution of ombudsman, in the
sense described above, is unknown. Its functions are carried out by the pe-
titionsÕ commission (a commission which reviews the grievances and peti-
tions that may be submitted to the representative body by anyone) and the
separate administrative court system. In parallel, the citizens are entitled to
submit individual letters of appeal to the Constitutional Court. However,
Germany also has the institution of the Bundestag defense commissioner,
which is provided for by federal statute and the Constitution (Article 45b of
the Constitution, a new provision passed in connection with the countryÕs
accession to NATO). This institution is designed to protect basic rights and
to act as a supporting body of the federal parliament when exercising par-
liamentary control. The commissioner is appointed for a term of five years
by the President of the Republic after being supported by a majority secret
vote of all members of the Bundestag. To be appointed to this position, the
candidate must be at least 35 years old and have served at least one year in
the army. The Ombudsman may not occupy any other public or profes-
sional position. His status is that of a federal minister. Every soldier has the
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right to approach the commissioner directly and personally. Also, the com-
missioner can take action at his own initiative or following the instructions
of the Bundestag or the Defense Committee. When exercising his powers,
he can require that the minister of defense, and the institutions and indivi-
duals subordinated to the minister of defense, respond to his inquiries and
make information available to him. His annual reports are discussed in a ple-
nary session of the Bundestag.
The ombudsman institution is widely spread throughout Central and Eastern
Europe and among a number of former Soviet Republics. It was first intro-
duced in Poland, under the old regime. The first commissioner for protec-
tion of civil rights took office on 1 January 1988 on the basis of a special
statute of 15 July 1987, the key provisions of which are now incorporated in
the Polish Constitution of 1989. Despite the attacks of many politicians and
the skepticism of a large number of members of the legal community, the
efforts for establishing the institution in Poland were successful and its ex-
perience must be taken into account. The Polish ombudsman follows the
classical Scandinavian model of the institution. He is elected by the Lower
Chamber of Parliament, following an approval of the Senate, for a term of
four years which may not be further extended. He must be a Polish citizen,
have knowledge of law, professional experience, good reputation in society,
and political and ideological neutrality. The Ombudsman may not occupy
any other positions. He has broad powers with respect to the administrative
bodies and all other organizations which by their actions abuse civil rights,
freedoms and the basic principles of justice. Petitions are filed in a free-style
form, and the commissioner may act upon those filed by individuals, their
organizations or local self-governing bodies, or at his own initiative. He may
conduct an investigation independently, or require that such investigation is
carried out wholly or partially by the public controlling institutions, or ask
the Parliament to appoint the investigation. With his authority to make rec-
ommendations and proposals, the commissioner can initiate civil, criminal
or administrative proceedings or a special hearing of the case. He can also
ask the Constitutional Court to interpret the law and the Supreme Court to
comment on the scope of applicability of a respective statute.
The constitutions of a number of other countries also provide for the cre-
ation of the ombudsman institution. In Hungary this is the parliamentary
civil rights commissioner; in Slovenia Ñ the defender of the civil rights; in
Latvia Ñ the National Office for Human Rights; and in Romania Ñ the
public advocate.
By statute, the institution of the public advocate was created in Georgia in
May 1996. He is elected by a simple majority vote of all MPs for a period of
five years. Similarly, the institution of the human rights commissioner was
set up in Russia (by statute of February 1997). It is designed to contribute to
the reinforcement of the infringed rights of individuals, the development
and alignment of legislation with international law, and to investigate peti-
tions against the central or local governmental authorities. Besides the an-
nual activity reports, the commissioner can prepare special reports on the
enforcement of civil rights and freedoms. These special reports are officially
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published. Very similar is the situation in Uzbekistan where, according to
Article 1 of the statute passed in April 1997, the parliamentary commission-
er is Òa public officer responsible to secure parliamentary control over the
compliance with the human rights legislation in the Republic of Uzbekistan
by the central governmental institutions, the local self-government bodies,
the enterprises, the public agencies, the public organizations and the public
officers.Ó
In Lithuania, on the grounds of the Constitution and three acts adopted in
the period of 1994Ð1995, a council of five parliamentary ombudsmen was
set up whose primary responsibility is to investigate petitions related to
abuse of power and bureaucracy. Two of them are authorized to investigate
civil servants; one of them, military officers; and the other two, local gov-
ernment officials. Currently the establishment of an ombudsman who will
monitor sexual equality, the rights of children and human rights has been
discussed.
The Swedish model of the ombudsman institution prevails in Croatia with
some subtle deviations; for example, the ombudsman also controls the work
of the members of the local self-governing bodies, and is not granted im-
munity. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the election, status, functions and pow-
ers of its two ombudsman offices bear the features of the post-war situation
in the country.
In a number of countries such as Estonia, Kirgizstan, Moldova, Belarus,
Ukraine and Turkmenistan either draft laws have been prepared or the pos-
sibilities for introducing the ombudsman institution have been researched.
Taking into account the vital significance of this institution, the Council of
Europe adopted Recommendation R(85)13 of 23 September 1985 regarding
the ombudsman institution and Resolution (85)8 of 23 September 1985 re-
garding cooperation among the ombudsmen of member states, and be-
tween them and the Council of Europe.
The Council of Europe has organized six roundtables which emphasized the
necessity for the establishment of similar institutions in the countries which
do not yet have them. A mechanism for co-operation between the om-
budsmen of the member states is in place.
The establishment of effective institutions to guarantee the protection of hu-
man rights is one of the criteria for membership in the European Union, for-
mulated at the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. In
response to these requirements, the short-term priorities of the National
Strategy for accession of the Republic of Bulgaria to the EU, passed by the
Council of Ministers on 23 March 1998, include Òexpanding the discussion
regarding the introduction of the ombudsman institution for the purpose of
administering and safeguarding human rights.Ó
The present material regarding the possibilities for the creation of the om-
budsman institution in Bulgaria is aimed at encouraging a broader and more
comprehensive discussion which will ultimately result in finding the most ef-
fective and appropriate solution for the specific Bulgarian conditions.
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B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The viewpoint in favor of the introduction of the ombudsman institution in
Bulgaria primarily takes into account the countryÕs existing needs, the pub-
lic attitudes and the current political and constitutional realities. Also, it is
based on the comparative study and the comprehension of foreign experi-
ence. Although the best means of creating such an institution in Bulgaria
would have been its explicit provision in the Constitution (which would
have ensured the necessary prestige and efficiency), the prevailing opinion
is that at this stage a procedure for amending the Constitution will involve
unjustifiable time and effort to discuss an unknown and unpopular concept
with no prior tradition here. For this reason it is proposed to have the insti-
tution based on a special statute. This viewpoint is supported by the follow-
ing arguments:
¥ the past experience has been that the ombudsman in the European states
was established either on the basis of a special statute or a constitutional
provision. It is possible (as in the Polish case) that an institution can first be
created by a special statute and then incorporated in the Constitution as
well;
¥ according to the proposed viewpoint, the ombudsman should not have
any government powers and so does not affect the principle of separation of
powers; therefore, its incorporation in the Constitution is not mandatory,
according to the constitutional general principles (Article 1, para 2);
¥ the general principles of a special statute for the introduction of the om-
budsman will be supported by general constitutional principles and con-
cepts such as the rights of the individual and the individualÕs dignity and se-
curity (proclaimed as a supreme constitutional principle in the Preamble);
the principle of the rule-of-law state governed by the Constitution and the
laws of the country and obliged to protect the individualÕs life, dignity and
rights and to create favorable conditions for the free development of the in-
dividual and the civil society (Article 4); the principle of the free market
economy based on the requirement that law must secure and guarantee to
all physical and juridical persons equal legal conditions for conducting busi-
ness activities (Article 19, para. 1 and 2).
This approach, if adopted, will require a detailed legislative regulation of the
objectives, scope of activity, status, competence, functions, procedures and
organization of the work of the institution. Special attention must be given
to the relationship between the institution and the constitutional institutions
exercising the powers of state. The future statute should be in conformity
with the Constitution and the other relevant legislation in order to provide
for the broadest possible and most effective legitimate scope for the institu-
tionÕs activities.
The present material proposes the creation of the institution of one nation-
al ombudsman with general responsibilities which will combine the char-
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acteristics of the classical Scandinavian ombudsman model with some of the
new features of its modern versions existing in the European countries, and
with some adjustments according to conditions in Bulgaria. The proposed
concept has the following characteristics:
The establishment of the ombudsman institution is aimed at creating a new
type of guarantee for the rights and freedoms of individuals and their orga-
nizations as proclaimed by the Constitution and sanctioned by internation-
al law. The institution would add to the traditional mechanisms for protec-
tion such as the classical parliamentary mechanisms (primarily the parlia-
mentary commissions), the constitutional justice, the judicial and adminis-
trative control, the media and non-governmental organizations. The forma-
tion of this new institution reveals the reasons which made it necessary in
the first place, placing it among but distinguishing it from the existing mech-
anisms.
In the modern world the influence and range of activity of the administra-
tion at all levels is increasing. More and more central or local governmental
authorities with their actions, visible or invisible, affect the private
persons Ñ individuals and legal entities Ñ on a daily basis. The existing
mechanisms are not always in a position to secure a quick, timely, efficient
and easily accessible protection of the parties affected by the actions of the
administration. This creates the need for a new mechanism which will not
duplicate the functions of the existing mechanisms but, rather, will operate
parallel to them, add to their work, initiate directly or indirectly their inter-
ference, and under some circumstances, be their alternative.
The most essential function of the ombudsman institution will be to guaran-
tee more efficiently the rights and freedoms of private persons. If the former
are abused by the public authorities, the ombudsman shall be entitled to
propose measures for terminating the acts of abuse, compensating the in-
curred damages and creating conditions for their smooth and efficient exer-
cise in the future. The functions of the ombudsman will be carried out by
observing the regulation of public processes and monitoring the work of the
public authorities.
The basic functions of the institution predetermine the subject and the
scope of its activities. In general terms, the scope of its activities is concen-
trated in the point of intersection between the State and the civil society.
Thus, the subject matter of its authority will cover all cases in which the bor-
der between private and public, inherent to the rule-of-law state, was
breached, or in other words, all cases in which the public authorities, or pri-
vate persons vested with public functions, abuse the private rights and free-
doms proclaimed by national and international law or do not provide con-
ditions for their free exercise.
Its functions, therefore, are geared toward monitoring and specific control
within a comparatively broad scope which includes the regulation of society
in general: 1) the operation of the executive power and the administration
I. Basic
Functions,
Subject and
Scope of
Activities
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in its narrow meaning, 2) the organization and regulation of the judicial sys-
temÕs administration and 3) any other exercise of public activity.
For self-explanatory reasons, the subject and scope of the ombudsmanÕs ac-
tivities shall not include certain institutions and relationships between the
private and public sectors, as follows:
¥ firstly, the supreme state bodies: the National Assembly, the President,
the Constitutional Court and the judiciary. Sufficient grounds for excluding
the first two institutions is their immediate democratic legitimacy. The
Constitutional Court may be excluded by reason of its status as an indepen-
dent supreme constitutional body, functionally and organizationally sepa-
rate from the other branches of government. It is designed to safeguard the
constitutional consensus, protect the Constitution, and balance the power of
the public authorities Òat the topÓ of the governmental pyramid. The consti-
tutional principle for independence of the judicial system requires that its
constituent bodies perform their constitutional functions separately.
¥ secondly, the activities related to the exercising of judicial power by the
courts, the prosecution office, the investigation office, or to national securi-
ty and the countryÕs foreign policy.
1. The Person of the Ombudsman
Notwithstanding the name of the institution Ñ ombudsman, parliamentary
commissioner, human rights commissioner, public advocate, intermediary,
etc. Ñ the effectiveness of the institution will always depend on the person
of the Ombudsman. As foreign experience shows, the number of individu-
als who carry out this function may vary, and it may be possible to establish
a division of labor among them based on various criteria, for example gen-
eral and specific authority, national or local scope of activity, etc.
In Bulgaria, during the initial stage of the establishment of the institution, it
would be appropriate to have one individual who meets certain require-
ments outlined by law: Bulgarian citizenship, political neutrality, high pro-
fessional achievements, between a certain minimum and maximum age,
knowledge in the areas of domestic, international and European law, hold-
ing a university degree, and not occupying any other public position or func-
tion during the term of office. It is desirable that the individual is supported
by broad social circles and has certain qualities which will enable him to
gain and extend the public confidence, such as high civil ethics and com-
mitment to the ideas of humanity, democracy and justice.
2. Parliamentary Ombudsman
The successful performance of the tasks vested in the institution and the
prestige it obviously needs require that the ombudsman derive its powers
directly from the supreme representative body. This is the most common
practice in those countries where the institution is already in place. It is log-
ical that in Bulgaria, a parliamentary republic, the appointment should be
made directly by the Parliament in accordance with its authority to elect the
II. Status
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heads of the institutions created by statute (Article 84, para 8 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria).
Because of its parliamentary origin, the ombudsman will report to the
National Assembly periodically Ñ once a year seems to be the most appro-
priate period Ñ which will secure a high level of publicity and transparen-
cy for its activities and the results thereof. This effect will have a positive in-
fluence on those public institutions which do not fully respect the rights and
freedoms of private persons.
To ensure that the selection of candidates is done in a responsible manner,
and that there is a sufficient pool of qualified candidates, it is suggested that
proposals for ombudsman are made by the President, the Supreme
Judiciary Council and the Chairperson of the Constitutional Court, as
well as by a predetermined reasonable number of individuals.
It is suggested that the Council of Ministers (specifically, the prime minister)
should not be included in the list of the constitutional bodies who are enti-
tled to make a proposal for ombudsman because in the conditions of a par-
liamentary governance the Council of Ministers is anyway supported by the
parliamentary majority which, on its part, will always have the decisive vote
when the candidates are selected and the eventual choice is made.
The suggested mechanism for proposing candidates for ombudsman will
soften the politicization of the parliamentary debate and the election
process, and will prevent the transformation of the parliamentary ombuds-
man into a governmental one. At the same time, it aims at creating condi-
tions for proposing competitive candidates, for selectivity and alternativity of
the choice and for the recruitment of the best candidate.
3. Appointment and Term of Office
The ombudsman must be elected directly by the National Assembly with a
simple majority vote, as the present Constitution does not provide for any
other alternative. If the institution gains the public confidence and performs
as hoped, amendments to the Constitution can be considered, including the
introduction of a qualified majority for election and dismissal of the om-
budsman. This would mean a larger consensus between the political forces
represented in parliament, and therefore a larger guarantee for the inde-
pendence of the ombudsman, for the confidence in it, and for the effective
performance of its functions.
The ombudsman should be appointed for a specific term which must not
coincide with the term of office of the body which elects him. It is recom-
mended that the term of office of the ombudsman be longer than the term
of office of the National Assembly (for example, five or more years). The
number of possible terms of office should be limited to only one or, at most,
two.
In order to ensure the democratic character of the institution and to guar-
antee the diligent performance of the full scope of its duties, the dismissal of
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the ombudsman should be possible following the same procedure as for his
election.
The other grounds for termination of the authorities of the ombudsman, be-
sides his dismissal, can be similar to the ones applicable to the termination
of an MPÕs term of office as listed in Article 72, para 1 of the Constitution Ñ
namely resignation, effective imprisonment sentence for a willful crime or
any imprisonment sentence which has not been suspended, violation of any
of the requirements for occupying the position, or death.
4 Independence and Immunity
While performing its main functions, the ombudsman should adhere strict-
ly to the Constitution and the laws, international contracts and agreements
and should be guided by his own conscience and morality. For this reason
it is necessary to legislatively guarantee his autonomy and full independence
from any and all bodies in the performance of his assigned functions.
One of the conditions for securing the independence of the institution is to
grant its representative immunity equal to the immunity of MPs; i.e., the
person should be protected from arrest and criminal investigation except in
the case of a serious criminal offense, in which case the permission of the
National Assembly (and when the latter is not in session, the permission of
its Chairman) should be required. A permission for arrest should not be re-
quired only if the person is caught at the crime scene; however, the National
Assembly or its Chairman, if the National Assembly is not in session, must be
immediately informed (Art. 70 of the Constitution of Republic of Bulgaria).
5 Budget and Organization of the Activity
of the Ombudsman Office
The budget of the institution can be determined by the National Assembly
in two ways Ñ either as a part of the budget of the National Assembly it-
self, or as a separate part of the state budget. In all cases the executive
power bodies Ñ the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Finance Ñ
shall not be entitled to take part in the preparation, execution or account-
ing of the ombudsmanÕs budget. It could perhaps be similar to the inde-
pendent budget of the judicial power (for more details please refer to
Decision No 18 of 16.12. 1993 on the constitutional case No 19/93 of the
Constitutional Court of Republic of Bulgaria, State Gazette 1/94). The solu-
tion should allow the ombudsman to perform his main functions without
being Òforced to his kneesÓ or placed in the condition of dependence from
any other factors.
Any apprehension concerning misuse of funds is irrelevant here, since the
ombudsmanÕs activity is public at any time and its annual report to the
Parliament will include a section on the expenses incurred.
In addition to the above, it is necessary that the most important points of the
organization and structuring of the ombudsmanÕs office are regulated in a
legislative manner by granting its employees the status of state servants. On
the basis of an explicit provision of the law the ombudsman shall be able to
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adopt internal rules for the functioning of his office, appoint and dismiss his
employees and define their duties and remuneration. His remuneration can
be determined by the National Assembly at the time of his election, or can
be defined correlatively in the law Ñ for example, to be equal to the re-
muneration of a Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly, or not less
than the remuneration of a Supreme Court judge.
The ombudsman should have certain authorities in order to perform suc-
cessfully his main functions and the tasks that were assigned to him. These
authorities are to a great extent predetermined by the fact that the om-
budsman will be placed outside the system of state bodies, by its role of an
intermediary between the state and society as a guardian and guarantor of
private rights and freedoms.
1. Types of Responsibilities and Authority
In general, the range of the ombudsmanÕs responsibilities and authority
should include the following:
¥ to review petitions in any form from private persons Ñ individuals and le-
gal entities, whether local and/or foreign, as well as from individuals with no
citizenship;
¥ to conduct investigations and examinations when a particular case has
been referred to him;
¥ to make proposals and recommendations to all observed institutions with
public powers or functions regarding their respect for human rights and free-
doms, and to recommend possible remedies for the infringement of certain
rights and freedoms and the reasons for that infringement, notwithstanding
whether the ombudsman acts at somebodyÕs request or his own initiative;
¥ to extend recommendations and give advice to petitioners;
¥ to act as an intermediary between private persons and public entities in
order to overcome the existing infringements on private rights and free-
doms;
¥ to request and receive timely, complete and precise information from all
observed institutions;
¥ to have direct access to the observed institutions, including their meet-
ings, discussions and other forums;
¥ to give and announce publicly his opinions on cases he has been ap-
proached with or on issues on which he makes summaries and conclusions
at his own discretion;
¥ to approach the prosecution bodies when, as a result of his observations
and investigations, the ombudsman has obtained information on a commit-
ted crime;
¥ to prepare and present an annual report to the National Assembly;
II. Powers, Basic
Principles and
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¥ to prepare special reports, if necessary, and to inform the Parliament in-
cidentally about particularly serious cases of disrespect and abuse of rights.
It is important to keep in mind that the ombudsmanÕs right to receive infor-
mation and have access to relevant documents and institutions is related to
the check-ups it carries out, and naturally this right corresponds to the ob-
served institutionsÕ obligation to provide the requested information and the
required access. Nobody shall, under the excuse of a state, official or trade
secret, obstruct the ombudsmanÕs work. At the same time the ombudsman
shall keep confidential and shall not disclose any secret information which
has become known to him in the course of, or in connection with, the ex-
ercise of his powers.
In connection with the outlined limitation of the ombudsmanÕs scope of ac-
tivity, it should once again be noted that the ombudsman is not entitled to
make any proposals or give recommendations and opinions in substance re-
lated to the actions of the judicial power bodies, nor is it entitled to inter-
fere in any way in their function to administer justice. The ombudsman does
not have a right to legislative initiative, nor to approach the Constitutional
Court.
2. Basic Principles in the OmbudsmanÕs Activity
In its activity the ombudsman shall be governed by principles predeter-
mined by the perceived view of its legal status, its place outside the system
of the state bodies and the scope of their authority. When the principles
are defined it should be explicitly emphasized that the ombudsman is pri-
marily a spokesman and defender of the public attitudes and disposi-
tions regarding the exercise of public powers and functions. Therefore,
the ombudsmanÕs authorities do not compete with the authorities of the
constitutional bodies. The ombudsman has none of their means for influ-
ence and enforcement. He does not grant legal protection, nor does he
control the legality or discretionary powers of the administration. His
mechanisms of influence are within the sphere of morality, prestige and
publicity. The following basic principles of the ombudsmanÕs function can
be formulated:
¥ judgment as to whether all observed institutions carry out their activity in
compliance with the requirements for fair and efficient government;
¥ judgment as to what measures are to be taken, according to the require-
ments of the rule-of-law state and to his own conscience and understanding
of justice;
¥ political and institutional independence in the exercise of his authority.
3. Petitions and Procedures
The ombudsman shall exercise his authority following extremely simplified
and informal procedures. Therefore, no special forms with any obligatory
requisites shall be envisaged for the petitions given to the ombudsman. The
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only requirement of the petition is to include information on the petitioner,
the offense and the offender.
Along with the free-style written form of the petition, verbal ones are also
acceptable on the condition that they are filed in a manner which unques-
tionably identifies the petitioner. This approach will make the institution of
the ombudsman easily accessible and open to anyone whose rights have
been infringed, irrespective of any other procedures and means of protec-
tion which can be taken in parallel. This accessibility is further enhanced by
the fact that the filing of the petition and the entire procedure for its review
will be free of charge for the petitioner.
In order to prevent the overloading of the ombudsman with petitions whose
settlement is beyond his powers (which can be expected, considering the
slow and expensive procedures for defense in the country, the presence of
a considerable number of unsolved court disputes, the complicated legal
cases, etc.), the law should explicitly state that the ombudsman cannot ini-
tiate proceedings on behalf of the persons who have approached him, can-
not represent them before the court or another institution (i.e., does not rep-
resent them in the narrow legal meaning), cannot approach the
Constitutional court and does not have legislative initiative. In addition, the
introduction of a Òstatute of limitationsÓ may be considered; e.g., the om-
budsman shall engage only with such cases having occurred one or at most
two years before the date of submitting the petition, and, for the rest, the
ombudsman shall be entitled to decide whether to accept them.
After a petition has been submitted following any of the above procedures,
the ombudsman shall respond within a fixed term to the petitioner whether
the petition is accepted or not without having to give the reasons for his an-
swer. Irrespective of its content and form, an answer should always be giv-
en! There should be no restriction on a second or further approach if the pe-
tition has not been accepted. The ombudsman shall be entitled to decide on
the acceptability of the petition not only at the date of its submission but al-
so at a later stage, at any time in the course of the investigation.
When a petition has been accepted, the ombudsman shall, within his pow-
ers, and with the help of his employees, take the necessary actions for gath-
ering information, including examination of documents, direct observation
of the activity of the respective institutions, inquiries, etc. If he ascertains the
presence of any action or inaction which has led to the infringement of the
rights and freedoms of the petitioner or to the prevention of their exercise,
he can relay his recommendations and proposals to the relevant institutions.
He may also follow this course if, instead of acting on a specific petition, he
has acted on his own initiative and come to a generalized conclusion con-
cerning rights and freedoms.
The institutions to which the recommendations and proposals are extended
should be obliged to answer within a fixed term whether they accept them
or not and to inform the ombudsman of the measures which they have tak-
en or intend to take and their prospective timing.
4. Report of the Ombudsman before the National Assembly
The report is submitted to the Parliament annually; e.g., at the beginning or
the end of every calendar year. It should contain at least the following parts:
¥ information about the solved cases;
¥ information about the cases in which the ombudsmanÕs intervention was
unsuccessful and the reasons for that;
¥ general information about the submitted petitions pending investigation;
¥ information about extended proposals and recommendations which have
or have not been taken into consideration;
¥ expense report.
A summary of the report can be published in the State Gazette and the full
text should be available at the ombudsmanÕs office to anyone interested.
The report has an extremely important role for the publicity of the ombuds-
manÕs activity. It is equally important in exposing the activity of those insti-
tutions which do not respect, or infringe on incidentally or systematically,
the rights of private persons, and whether or not they take into account the
ombudsmanÕs recommendations and inform him of the undertaken mea-
sures. The information about the successfully resolved cases can serve also
as a model for settlement of similar cases.
It would be useful for the office of the ombudsman to issue, within its au-
thority and budget, a bulletin periodically announcing information about its
activity as well as about the activities of similar institutions in other countries.
v v v
In conclusion, the present viewpoint is based on the expectation that the
positive effect of the ombudsmanÕs opinions, recommendations and pro-
posals would not be limited to the settlement of individual cases. The suc-
cessful development of this institution can make it an important factor in the
evolution of general principles and rules governing the administrationÕs
functioning and state servantsÕ attitudes. The efficient, high-quality work of
the ombudsmanÕs office would raise its reputation, gaining the public trust
and respect that is so vital to his authority.
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Coalition 2000 is an initiative of a number of Bulgarian non-governmental or-
ganizations aimed at combating corruption through a process of coopera-
tion among governmental institutions, NGOs and individuals drafting an
Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Bulgaria, and implementing an awareness
campaign and a monitoring system.
I. BACKGROUND
The 1990s marked the transition of corruption from a predominately na-
tional and regional concern to a truly global issue. In the context of the glob-
al economy, it not only diminishes the efficiency of government but also be-
comes a major impediment for international development.
The Coalition 2000 process was started in March 1997 as a result of the ini-
tiative of the Center for the Study of Democracy and a number of other
Bulgarian NGOs with the support of the United States Agency for
International Development, and was officially launched on April 7, 1998.
Among the multitude of reasons for the preoccupation with corruption and
for launching Coalition 2000 the more important are:
¥ the global trend towards accountable and transparent government as a
precondition for development. The purpose of this anti-corruption drive is
not simply to reduce malfeasance and graft, but to enhance the efficiency
and transparency of government, individual freedoms and human rights;
¥ the problem of corruption is especially acute in the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe (CEECs) because of the enormous task of their rapid
transition from closed societies with total state control over the economy to
open political democracies and market economies. Further, corruption has
produced a generally volatile environment for reforms and caused govern-
ment instability, thus undermining long term policies and development;
¥ the problem of corruption in Bulgaria has been exacerbated by short-
sighted policies and a lack of vision on the part of successive previous gov-
ernments. The period 1997Ð1998 has marked significant change in this re-
spect. In March 1998, in a briefing on Bulgaria and the enlargement of the
European Union, the European Parliament pointed out: ÒThe fight against
organized crime has been a major priority for the government, since the
launch in April 1997 of an intensive anti-crime programme. Both the present
government and the previous caretaker administration have demonstrated a
clear will to tackle corruption both in the public sector and in society at
large.Ó;
¥ as in other countries, the increasing role of non-governmental organiza-
tions in the fight against corruption is being acknowledged by both govern-
ments and the international community. The Coalition 2000 initiative is a pi-
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oneering and comprehensive effort to harness the capacity of the civil soci-
ety to establish a publicÐprivate coalition against corruption.
II. OBJECTIVES
The main objective of Coalition 2000 is to enhance the awareness, adoption
and practical implementation of democratic values such as transparency,
trust, and integrity. This is achieved through the development of an Anti-
Corruption Action Plan for Bulgaria. Designed to complement each other,
the several kinds of activities include:
1. Promote public awareness of corruption and establish mechanisms to support
anti-corruption efforts through public education, advocacy and dissemina-
tion of information.
2. Assist democratic institution building, promotion of democratic values, and
elaboration of an anti-corruption Action Plan by organizing panels of experts
and legislators to develop amendments to the institutional arrangements
and regulatory framework that help deter corruption, particularly among
public officials.
3. Serve as a ÒwatchdogÓ of the reform process, focusing attention on practi-
cal implementation of transparent and clear rules of the game, integrity, and
democratic control.
III. CONCEPT AND DESIGN
The concept for structuring the activities of Coalition 2000 rests upon sever-
al ideas and definitions which identify the focus of the process and the main
target groups of the activities. Corruption, in the context of the initiative, will be
defined as the abuse of public power for private gain. Thus, the principal agents
of corrupt practices to be considered are the various categories of public ad-
ministration officials.
The factors and circumstances which generate corrupt practices in Bulgaria
make it necessary that anti-corruption efforts address several aspects of the
problem: the legislative framework, the administrative set-up, the existing
perceptions and attitudes (public awareness), and the existing behavior pat-
terns. In this respect the anti-corruption effort of Coalition 2000 is parallel to
the social marketing model used in anti-corruption campaigns developed by
WB experts1. The model includes three basic targets of an anti-corruption
1 Kidra, G.S., Stapenhurst, R., Social Marketing Strategies to Fight Corruption, The
Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1998
campaign which address the principal factors of corruption: monopoly
(which in the case of Bulgaria is the predominance of the state in the econ-
omy and other sectors of social life), discretionary power (i.e., the lack of clear
administrative rules and regulations) and accountability (i.e., poor functioning
of watchdog agencies or a lack of such agencies).
The desired impact (curbing corruption) could be produced following a
three stage process, including: cognitive change (this involves problem diag-
nostics and formulation of a research-based impact strategy); inducing affect
(this is the process of converting messages into emotional/moral commit-
ments); behavioral change (this involves inducing people to change some as-
pects of their actual behavior and transforming moral disapproval into an ac-
tion agenda of the public).
In view of the targeted corruption factors, Ackerman2 classifies anti-corrup-
tion strategies into four main categories: those that lower the benefits under
control of officials; those that reduce the discretionary power of officials;
those that increase the costs of bribery; those that limit the bargaining pow-
er of officials.
With respect to the above categorization, the effort of Coalition 2000 is mul-
tifaceted. In terms of content its social marketing impact is based upon the
following main elements:
Creating a trustworthy anti-corruption agency through consensus and coalition
building. In addition to being the result of a partnership effort, it will enable
a favorable environment for the establishment of future coalitions. The ini-
tiative aims to promote the embedding of democratic values in the legal and
institutional framework of reforms and to integrate democratic values in the
policy design and implementation process. The main component of con-
sensus building is the Policy Forum: a policy design tool which starts at expert
level with the identification of problems, and culminates in a public forum
which involves representatives of all relevant institutions and organizations
and which endorses a consensus policy document (Anti-Corruption Action
Plan).
Obtaining relevant knowledge through a series of corruption assessment panels.
The principal objective of the assessment is to analyze the scope, intensity,
types, and sources of corrupt behavior in the public sector. The methodol-
ogy includes both quantitative and qualitative surveys. Indicators used for
corruption assessment will at later stages be used to monitor institutional
progress and to produce a Corruption Assessment Index.
Defining the impact objectives: development of an Action Plan (AP). Based on re-
search findings and best practice documentation, an AP is designed. It in-
corporates different mechanisms enhancing trust and transparency in differ-
ent sectors of public life. Impact in this respect is maximized by involving
policy-makers and representatives of the business community and trade
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unions in the drafting process. Of particular importance is the fact that the
AP is a consensus document approved by the principal actors in Bulgarian so-
ciety; furthermore, based on the consensus reached, the implementation of
the AP will largely be a result of the joint effort of all parties involved in the
drafting process.
Bringing about affective and behavioral change through dissemination and advo-
cacy. The effective implementation of the AP will be supported through dif-
ferent mechanisms: a) building awareness of corruption and its various
forms in Bulgarian society by using different forms of public education, pub-
lic discussions and dissemination of the research findings and policy recom-
mendations; b) transforming public awareness into an advocacy role, keep-
ing the issue of corruption at the forefront; c) pressing government to im-
plement anti-corruption strategy and reforms.
Reinforcing the cognitive component and tracking progress through process mon-
itoring (Corruption Monitoring System). The basic function of process monitor-
ing is to assess the effectiveness of policy change efforts in all major areas en-
visioned in the AP and the functioning of the established anti-corruption in-
stitutions. The monitoring will serve also as a ÒwatchdogÓ tool of the public
policy process and as a way to encourage public discussions.
IV. ACTIVITIES
The initiative consists of a series of policy analysis, policy design, dissemina-
tion, and public outreach activities. Special attention is devoted to including
relevant experts, policy makers, legislators, NGO representatives, and inde-
pendent researchers at different stages of the work on each component:
Activities within this component were implemented in several stages as fol-
lows:
1. Conducting a series of Corruption Assessment Surveys and
Preparing a Corruption Assessment Report
At the initial stage of the process, corruption assessment helps evaluate the
status of corruption in different areas of public life and maps the specific
characteristics of the perceptions of the general public, public officials, ex-
perts, and political decision makers.
The basic findings of the first Corruption Monitoring System surveys is
used to prepare the Corruption Assessment Report. The initial analysis and
information from the individual surveys has had an instrumental role in the
work of the task force drafting the Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Bulgaria.
Corruption assessment surveys are part of the Corruption Monitoring System
(CMS) of Coalition 2000 which is elaborated in greater detail in Component
3 below.
Component 1:
Corruption
Assessment and
Development of
an Anti-
Corruption Action
Plan
2. Elaborating an Action Plan
Following the official launch of Coalition 2000, the Steering Committee set
up the task force of over 30 experts who drafted the outline document Anti-
Corruption Action Plan for Bulgaria. In consultations with over 70 con-
cerned institutions and experts, the different kinds of expertise which need-
ed to be made available to the task force were identified, including: politi-
cal science and history, economics and business management, law, media
analysis, survey research, and criminology.
3. Conducting a Policy Workshop to discuss the draft Action Plan
Following the preparatory work of the task force, the outline document was
circulated among all concerned institutions Ñ governmental, non-govern-
mental and international Ñ in order to solicit their comments and additions.
The institutions contributed suggestions for action lines corresponding to
their experience and relevant expertise related to key aspects of a compre-
hensive anti-corruption strategy.
A Policy Workshop was convened on July 7, 1998 at a deputy ministerial/ex-
pert level in order to finalize the suggestions and comments to the outline
document. All institutions consulted were invited to participate. The
Workshop brought together 50 representatives of business associations, se-
nior government officials, financial experts, representatives of the private
sector and other concerned institutions.
4. Conducting a Policy Forum to discuss and endorse the final
version of the Action Plan
As a result of the consultations and workshop discussions, the task force of
experts produced an Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Bulgaria to be con-
sidered by the members of the Policy Forum during its first meeting in
November 1998. In advance of the meeting, the Action Plan has been cir-
culated among the members of the Forum. Each Forum member is being
briefed individually on the objectives of the whole process in order to facil-
itate the discussions during the Forum meeting.
Following its adoption by the Policy Forum, the Action Plan is expected to
serve as a long-term reference document allowing interested parties to seek
separate technical and financial assistance and additional partners for the
implementation of its various action lines. Having been agreed upon as a re-
sult of an inclusive process of extensive consultations at expert and policy
level by the major governmental, non-governmental and international orga-
nizations concerned with the issues of corruption in Bulgaria, the Action
Plan will continue to provide coherence to future anti-corruption efforts.
The majority of activities under this component of the Coalition 2000 process
will be conducted following the first Policy Forum. All activities are focused
on creating an atmosphere which discourages fraud and corruption. This
may be achieved primarily by raising public awareness about the costs of
corruption in Bulgarian society to the country, by raising a concern about
Component 2:
Anti-Corruption
Awareness
Campaign
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corruption within the national institutions, by increasing the general under-
standing in society of the causes of corruption, and by influencing public be-
havior. A special effort will be made to launch practical, action-based initia-
tives as they provide immediate reinforcement of anti-corruption reform ef-
forts by promoting practical examples and Òsuccess stories.Ó
1. Awareness Program
Since the main task of Coalition 2000 is to bring about considerable shift in
attitudes towards corruption in Bulgarian society, the awareness program
will constitute a core component. The emphasis on awareness intended to
produce attitudinal changes is built on the premise that anti-corruption atti-
tudes translate into mechanisms rewarding appropriate, or punishing inap-
propriate, behavior, thus reducing the level of acceptance of such practices
in society.
The process will focus on three main target groups considered to be of key
significance for the success of anti-corruption reform: (1) the general public,
(2) policy decision makers and elite professionals, and (3) the international com-
munity.
The awareness program envisages the utilization of a mix of national and lo-
cal print media, national radio, private radio networks, television and the
Internet.
2.1. General Public
General public support and participation are essential to any successful an-
ti-corruption campaign. In raising public awareness Coalition 2000 will focus
on such messages as:
¥ corruption has a negative impact on development and economic pros-
perity;
¥ corruption causes the misallocation of public resources; i.e., it effectively
steals money from ordinary people;
¥ the public is entitled to a certain basic quality of services which is denied
by corrupt administrative practices;
¥ only through the participation of the general public can corruption be
curbed and prevented. Corruption occurs because the public does not stand
up to it.
All existing media channels will be used to promote the anti-corruption
messages throughout Bulgarian society. The selection is based on a good
understanding of the media preferences of the population. Radio will be
used widely as one of the key instruments for achieving the desired aware-
ness effect. Private radio stations will be invited to contribute public service
time in kind. Print media will also be used extensively. Articles in popular
newspapers and specialized magazines will explain the causes of corruption,
specific manifestations, economic costs, etc. to the public. The national
news agency, BTA, will be the primary vehicle for communicating informa-
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tion about the work of the Coalition to local newspapers and television sta-
tions. The promotional tools to be used in the implementation of the general
public awareness campaign are divided into two groups: direct (involving
and/or addressing the public directly) and indirect (reaching the target audi-
ences through a medium).
2.2. Policy Decision Makers and Elite Professionals
This target group includes politicians, parliamentarians, senior civil servants,
members of the judiciary, academia and the media. The objectives of the
awareness campaign for elite segments are: (1) to mainstream a concern for
corruption within national institutions; (2) to increase understanding of
causal factors and the variety of manifestations of corruption among nation-
al institutions; (3) to influence behavior of corrupt, and potentially corrupt
individuals by promoting new norms of acceptable behavior; and (4) to cre-
ate a receptive attitude to the structural, procedural and administrative
changes that will have to take place throughout the public institutions.
A variety of information and training activities are designed to implement
this component. Anti-corruption issues will be brought to the attention of
elite representatives on a regular basis through such vehicles as insight and
analysis articles in specialized journals and magazines, survey research pa-
pers, best practices documentation, anti-corruption readers, a Coalition 2000
Newsletter, Public Information Desk, electronic mailing list, online discus-
sions, etc.
A public service training program will be developed, and implemented with
the assistance of the International Development Law Institute (IDLI) in
Rome. It envisages a series of training seminars for target groups such as se-
nior public service officials, members of the judiciary and National Audit
Office. Round table discussions will be organized at the local community lev-
el for an audience including mayors of municipalities, local government of-
ficials, key opinion leaders, business representatives, local NGOs and civil
society, intellectuals, academics, and journalists.
2.3. The International Community
Coalition 2000 is a local effort and cannot be credible without the support of
the concerned Bulgarian public and private institutions. At the same time,
DIRECT
¥ Information days
¥ Townhall meetings
¥ ÒAnti-corruptionÓ events
¥ Logo, poster and cartoon compe-
titions
INDIRECT
¥ Popular newspaper articles
¥ Insight and analysis articles in
specialized newspapers and
magazines
¥ Press conferences
¥ Educational radio programs
¥ Public service announcements
and radio clips
Coalition 2000 Process 127
the international dimension of the initiative is of key significance for the
achievement of its primary objectives. The international cooperation inter-
face of Coalition 2000 is envisaged in three complementary directions:
1. International promotion effort of the objectives and results of the
Coalition. By disseminating information to the international community
about the activities and achieved results, Coalition 2000 contributes to an im-
proved international knowledge and appreciation of BulgariaÕs anti-corrup-
tion efforts.
2. Coordination and cooperation with international organizations imple-
menting anti-corruption programs in Bulgaria. The objective here is to allow
the local effort to benefit from the expertise and experience of internation-
al organizations and multilateral agencies.
3. Enhancing the awareness of the Bulgarian public as to the significance
of cooperation with international organizations in the field of anti-cor-
ruption. By inviting foreign and international organizations to provide infor-
mation about their anti-corruption activities as part of the awareness instru-
ments, Coalition 2000 will establish a cost effective mechanism of promoting
these efforts to the Bulgarian public.
2. Pilot Anti-Corruption Initiatives to Raise Awareness through
Practical Examples
The problems that are to be addressed in the pilot initiatives will be speci-
fied further on the basis of the Action Plan. In this respect priority areas
could be:
¥ Administrative reform;
¥ Ethics Codes for government administration officials at the central and lo-
cal level;
¥ Disclosure of Income/Assets/Gifts of high-ranking state officials and mem-
bers of Parliament;
¥ Watchdog Agencies: National Audit Office, Ombudsman, Anti-
Corruption Agencies;
¥ Judicial reform and accountability of the judicial process.
The Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000 includes a sys-
tem of empirical studies and analytical reports. The main objective of the
CMS is to regularly present information which would facilitate conclusions
about the scope of corruption in the country, as well about the related pub-
lic attitudes, assessments and expectations.
The CMS is designed to perform specific functions within each of the
Components of the Coalition 2000 process:
Corruption Diagnostics. The first CMS panel of surveys is conducted at the
initial stage. At this stage the CMS is the major diagnostic tool. It helps evalu-
Component 3:
Process monitor-
ing: The
Corruption
Monitoring
System (CMS)
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ate the status of corruption in different areas of public life and maps the spe-
cific characteristics of the perceptions of the general public, public officials,
experts, and political decision makers.
Targeting. Surveys included in the CMS help identify specific target audi-
ences (based on attitudes and perceptions) for the practical initiatives of
Coalition 2000. The CMS also helps identify the most effective media chan-
nels for reaching the specific audiences.
Message design. Some of the CMS surveys are specifically targeted at test-
ing and tailoring the messages of the awareness campaign of Coalition 2000.
This will help the awareness campaign achieve maximum efficiency.
Analysis of patterns of corrupt behavior. CMS survey results and analyses
will be one of the essential content elements of the awareness campaign. In
this respect the CMS will be a major provider of analyses aimed at generat-
ing public debate on corruption issues in Bulgarian society.
The basic functions of the CMS are related to its major outputs: the
Corruption Indices of Coalition 2000 and the Corruption Assessment
Report. Corruption indices are based on the surveys included in the CMS
and will summarize the most important corruption indicator variables to
evaluate/measure the level of proliferation of corrupt practices in different
spheres of society. Corruption Indices of Coalition 2000 will be published
four times a year. In addition to that, the other functions of the CMS are:
1. To provide reliable feedback about the effectiveness of the anti-corruption
initiatives of Coalition 2000.
2. To maintain, on the basis of the collected information, regular feedback
with the relevant institutions in order to support the implementation of mech-
anisms that constrain corrupt practices.
The empirical information collected through CMS surveys will be made
available (on demand) to research agencies and government bodies in
Bulgaria, as well as international organizations, for further analysis and re-
porting. Through the establishment of an Expert Council an effort has been
made to coordinate corruption assessment research in order to elaborate a
methodology which ensures maximum reliability of data and objectivity of
analyses.
Structure of the CMS. CMS includes several basic types of surveys to be con-
ducted with different regularity.
Survey Type Time-frame
1. Quantitative national representative survey Quarterly
of the population
2. Quantitative survey of public officials Quarterly
3. Focus group discussions with experts Quarterly
4. Focus group discussions with public officials Yearly
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5. In-depth interviews with policy makers Yearly
6. Media monitoring Monthly
7. Testing Awareness Campaign Messages When necessary
of the Coalition 2000 with the Perception
Analyzer System
The surveys conducted quarterly are included in the Corruption Monitoring
Panel. Corruption Indices are devised from the quantitative surveys includ-
ed in the CMS. They make it possible to estimate the dynamics of public at-
titudes and actions, characterizing different aspects of corruption-related
phenomena. Regular observations also provide feedback on the effective-
ness of the anti-corruption initiatives in Bulgarian society and on the
progress toward achieving the goals of Coalition 2000. Qualitative studies in-
cluded in the Corruption Monitoring Panel will be used to improve and re-
fine the CMS design and methodology.
Once a year the Corruption Monitoring Panel will be expanded with two
additional qualitative surveys. On the basis of the extended Corruption
Monitoring Panel a Corruption Assessment Report will be prepared for the
annual Policy Forum. The report will summarize the results of all surveys
conducted in the preceding 12 months and will derive conclusions about
the scope and dimensions of corruption in the country. The Corruption
Assessment Report will also evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption ini-
tiatives.
V. THE COALITION 2000 PROCESS:
A PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIP
In summary, the Coalition 2000 process ensures that:
¥ it is open, in that it provides a mechanism through which the major stake-
holders Ñ governmental and non-governmental organizations, business as-
sociations and international organizations Ñ can provide input and partici-
pate in both the design and implementation in a way which best makes use
of their respective experience and expertise;
¥ it establishes a publicÐprivate dialogue and partnership in a process that
concerns the whole society;
¥ the process is transparent by means of regular dissemination of informa-
tion among concerned institutions and media outreach;
¥ the structure is flexible as it incorporates both public and private institu-
tions as well as prominent individuals;
¥ Coalition 2000 has its own distinct identity which is independent of the
identity and particular objectives of the participating organizations, although
it is not a separate legal entity;
¥ the initiative has a considerable public standing and high profile which
is in itself an important prerequisite for a substantial anti-corruption impact.
The initiative which resulted in this process was launched by the Center for
the Study of Democracy in March 1997 through a series of consultations
with Bulgarian institutions and, later, international partners. At the time,
CSD solicited the input of a number of Bulgarian NGOs as to the possible
format, scope and priorities of the development of a national anti-corrup-
tion Action Plan. The changes in the countryÕs political climate created a
more favorable environment for a comprehensive anti-corruption effort in-
volving both public and private non-profit organizations.
Particular attention was paid to the involvement of the judiciary in the de-
velopment phase. The design team was able to benefit from the input of the
Association of Judges in Bulgaria, particularly Ms. Kapka Kostova, Chair of
the Board and Chair of the Sofia Regional Court and Ms. Nelly Koutzkova,
Chair of the Sofia District Court.
CSD, in cooperation with the Information Centre on the Council of Europe
in Sofia (ICCES), and its Director, Mr. Boyko Todorov, has advised and re-
quested the opinion of the Council of Europe. The Council is a key inter-
national organization in this area and has already implemented a number of
intergovernmental anti-corruption projects in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria.
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The contacts with Transparency International (TI) were established in
December 1996. Various consultations with TI experts were carried out in
the development of the corruption assessment methodology. Cooperation
continues with the establishment of the TI Bulgarian Chapter.
Particularly important for elaborating the format and scope of the process
were the discussions with the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). At the end of July 1997, CSD hosted a meeting of
the USAID mission of anti-corruption experts to Bulgaria. Consultations
were continued with the local office of the Agency. Building on the experi-
ence of two policy projects of a similar format carried out with the support
of USAID Ñ on SME development in November 1996 and capital markets
in July 1997 Ñ CSD was in a position to provide an enhanced institutional
capacity for an anti-corruption coalition-building process focused on a pub-
lic awareness effort.
A number of meetings and consultations with representatives of the World
Bank (WB) and its Economic Development Institute (EDI) were held in or-
der to gain from the advanced experience of the Bank in this area. The EDI
and WB provided in 1997 documents and materials for the design phase
and advised CSD on various sources of expertise which could be utilized
during the implementation. A mission of the WB/EDI in September 1998 led
by Mr. Petter Langseth evaluated Coalition 2000 as a model strategy and sug-
gested some additional activities, including a public service delivery survey.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has long emphasized
improved governance as a condition for sustainable development. As a re-
sult of the consultations with Mr. Antonio Vigilante, Resident Coordinator of
the UN in Bulgaria, who has been very supportive of the initiative, it was
agreed that UNDPÕs local office will invite a number of internationally
renowned experts for short missions to Bulgaria to advise the initiative. The
experts have been involved in a number of similar efforts in Latin America
and other regions where the UNDP has programs.
VI. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
OF THE COALITION 2000
PROCESS
The process is designed to ensure both the transparency and efficiency of
implementation and the most appropriate use of the input of the stake-
holders. Being based on the partnership of public and private institutions, it
will allow the most effective implementation of the two main objectives Ñ
to develop a comprehensive strategy and plan for combating corruption and
to enhance the awareness of key target groups. In a nutshell, Coalition 2000
will be implemented under the following institutional structure:
¥ a Policy Forum of leading public and private institutions and prominent
personalities;
¥ a Steering Committee as the means for coordination;
¥ a Secretariat to provide operational management to the process.
The Policy Forum convenes once a year to review the results of the preced-
ing period, and to provide guidelines for the work over the next year. The
Forum consists of forty to fifty Members invited to participate by the Steering
Committee. Members are prominent public personalities with established
integrity and reputation as well as representatives of public and private in-
stitutions. The following groups of institutions are represented at the Forum:
¥ institutions of the state: executive government agencies, ministries,
committees, the National Assembly, the judiciary, including courts of all lev-
els, local government representatives, as well as the National Audit Office
and the Commission for the Protection of Competition;
¥ NGOs: Bulgarian foundations and associations, policy institutes, business
associations, regional development agencies, civic group representatives
and European and US foundations (local offices);
¥ international organizations: the Council of Europe, USAID/Bulgaria,
World Bank, the European Commission of the European Union, United
Nations Development Program, International Monetary Fund, etc.
The mandate of the Forum is based primarily on its role as a representative
public body overseeing the process, reviewing the progress and adopting
the agenda for future work. The effort receives increased public credibility
and legitimacy through the endorsement of a forum of leading personalities
and institutions.
Its meetings ensure that the work carried out under the Coalition 2000
process by various institutions reflects a consensus of the concerned public
and private institutions.
1. Policy Forum
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The main purpose of the first meeting of the Policy Forum is to discuss and
adopt an Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Bulgaria. In order to ensure that
the Action Plan is both comprehensive and based on advanced profession-
al expertise, the following activities have been carried out in the run-up
phase to the Forum:
Step One: Task Force
The expert task force was set up immediately following the official launch of
the Coalition to draft the outline document as a basis for the Anti-
Corruption Strategy and Action Plan.
Step Two: Policy Workshop
Following the completion of the work by the task force, the outline docu-
ment was circulated among all concerned institutions Ñ governmental,
non-governmental and international Ð in over 2000 copies in order to soli-
cit their comments and additions. Next, a policy workshop was convened at
the level of deputy ministers and experts in order to finalize the suggestions
and comments to the outline document. As a result of the consultations and
workshop discussions, the task force of experts finalized an Anti-Corruption
Action Plan for Bulgaria to be considered by the members of the Policy
Forum during its first meeting.
While the Policy Forum is intended to foster a general political and social
consensus on the implementation of the initiative, the Steering Committee
(SC) provides the coordination of the activities and outputs of the Coalition.
The group of NGOs which took the initiative Ð Access Association, Applied
Research and Communications Fund (ARC Fund), Association of Judges in
Bulgaria, the Center for the Study of Democracy, the Center for Economic
Development, the Center for Social Practices, the Economic Policy Institute
and the Information Centre on the Council of Europe, Sofia Ð invested a
particular effort into ensuring the representative nature of the SC. Thus the
set-up of the SC reflects both the history of the initiative as well as the con-
sultations and the publicity effort:
Mr. Asen Dulgerov Secretary, Sofia Municipality and Chair of the
Supervisory Board of the Privatization Agency
Mr. Boyko Todorov Director, Information Centre on the Council
of Europe, Sofia (ICCES)
Mr. Dimitar Batchvarov Head, Structural Reform Department,
Council of Ministers
Ms. Dinka Dinkova Program Director, Applied Research and
Communications Fund (ARC Fund)
Ms. Ekaterina Michailova President of the Parliamentary Group of UDF,
Deputy Chair of the Parliamentary Committee
to Counter Crime and Corruption
2. Steering
Committee
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Dr. Evgenii Dainov Director, Center for Social Practices (CSP),
and Chairman of the Board, Open Society
Foundation, Sofia
Dr. George Prohasky Director, Center for Economic Development
(CED) and Senior Advisor at the Council of
Ministers
Dr. Ivanka Petkova Director, Economic Policy Institute (EPI)
Ms. Kapka Kostova Chair of the Board, Association of Judges in
Bulgaria (AJB) and Chair, Sofia Regional Court
Ms. Nelly Koutzkova Chair, Sofia District Court
Ms. Nadezhda Sandolova National Audit Office, Head of Department
ÒCentral Bank and Internal DebtÓ
Dr. Ognian Shentov President, Center for the Study of Democracy
(CSD)
Dr. Stefan Hadjitodorov Secretary, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
Mr. Stanislav Daskalov President, European Movement Bulgaria
Mr. Valentin Dobrev Ambassador of Bulgaria to the United King-
dom
Dr. Valeri Roussanov President, Access Association
The Steering Committee meets regularly, approximately every four-to-six
weeks. The SC has a major role in the run-up to the Policy Forum meetings.
The Steering Committee prepares the meeting agenda through advance
consultations with the Forum members and reports to the Forum on the ac-
tivities and outputs during the preceding year. The structure of the Steering
Committee is intended to ensure two main objectives:
¥ efficient management covering all aspects: political/institutional, eco-
nomic, legal, information and interface with international institutions;
¥ publicÐprivate dialogue and partnership as a key prerequisite for a sub-
stantial impact.
For the purpose of providing permanent support to the work of the Steering
Committee, a Secretariat was set up at the Center for the Study of
Democracy. The Secretariat provides the day-to-day operational manage-
ment, logistical support and reporting for the activities.
In coordination with the Applied Research and Communications (ARC)
Fund the Secretariat maintains a public information desk hosting both on-
line and print materials. These include survey data, original research devel-
oped by the Coalition, major publications and studies in the field of anti-
corruption, reference links to relevant information, etc. Another task of the
Secretariat is to carry out monitoring visits/meetings in order to assist the co-
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ordination work of the Steering Committee. The Secretariat also surveys de-
velopments and initiatives, both locally and internationally, in the field of
anti-corruption and informs the Steering Committee, thus ensuring the ef-
fective coordination of the Coalition 2000 process with any other corre-
sponding effort.
v v v
Reducing corruption requires not only the relevant institution-building and
legislative measures but also creating the social preconditions for establish-
ing the rule of law. In this context, it is of decisive importance to foster a de-
mocratic political and economic culture based on trust and respect of gov-
ernment institutions, transparency and openness of the activities of the ad-
ministration, and an orientation towards stability and predictability of the
economic and social environment.
This Action Plan is a pioneering effort which provides a comprehensive
framework for cooperation among government agnecies, NGOs and inter-
national institutions in promoting a transparent and efficient public service
in Bulgaria. 
